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Abstract
The protection of the innocent is inextricably linked to the privilege
against self-incrimination. False confessions and incriminating statements
lead to wrongful conviction in approximately 27 percent of cases in which
true innocents are exonerated. The value of the privilege may be seen in the
fact that nearly 10 percent of exonerees pled guilty to crimes that they did
not commit.
An innocent debtor in bankruptcy who is either ignorant of her
constitutional right to the privilege against self-incrimination in bankruptcy,
or who is ineffectual in asserting it, may find herself wrongfully convicted
due to unwitting complicity in the delivery of testimony or documents. This
lack of understanding poses a serious risk to debtors, and particularly
affects the increasing number of pro se debtors.
Without any requirement of notice of the privilege against selfincrimination, there is no application of the exclusionary rule in bankruptcy
proceedings. Thus, the privilege must be invoked through an unambiguous
assertion in bankruptcy or it may be irretrievably lost. For this reason, the
Court, under its rulemaking authority, should adopt a revised Official Form
B201A providing pre-filing notice of the privilege in consumer bankruptcy
cases to prevent its waiver through ignorance, inadvertence, or lack of
competent counsel.
This article has four parts. Part I analyzes the scope and application of
the privilege and distinguishes the privilege in bankruptcy from its
counterpart in the custodial setting. Part II examines the increased risk to
the pro se debtor and the value of the privilege both to the truly innocent
who are seemingly guilty and to the presumptively innocent regardless of
guilt. Part III explores the plight of the debtor under current law and
explains the risk of nondisclosure of the privilege. Finally, Part IV proposes
a change in the language of Official Form B201A to alleviate the problems
caused by nondisclosure. In short, the author’s thesis is that only through
the pre-filing delivery of notice will the debtor's right to the privilege be
meaningful.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a truly innocent, yet seemingly guilty debtor, whose unwitting
complicity in the delivery of testimony or documents in her bankruptcy case may
lead to her wrongful conviction and imprisonment in a separate criminal matter
due to her ignorance of the existence of her constitutional right to the privilege
and her inability to assert it effectively. She is among the increasing number of
pro se debtors in bankruptcy.1 She does not know she is putting herself at risk to
be arrested and convicted because she, like most debtors in bankruptcy, is
unaware of much of the criminal law, though from a legal standpoint she is
deemed to know it.2 Before examining more closely the concepts of invocation,
waiver and the consequences associated with each, consider the hypothetical
plight of Sophie Debtor, truly innocent pro se debtor whose testimony would be
incriminating.
Sophie Debtor lives in Hard Luck Town.3 She is a working mom who is
separated from her husband, Hank. She lost her job and filed chapter 7 pro se
using forms on the court’s website. She will appear before a trustee at a 341
meeting in 30 days to be examined under oath about her finances including
transfers to others4 and cash advances.5 She may be asked to turn over
documents.6 Sophie is legally entitled to claim her 5th Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.7 However, its existence was not disclosed in the

1

Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other
Debtor Relief, Litigation News, December 29, 2011, available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-sebankruptcy-growing.html (last visited May 1/30/13). See infra Part II A and infra
note 79 for the amounts by which pro se filings increased. While other parties in
bankruptcy such as creditors, trustees and witnesses also enjoy the privilege, the
scope of this article is limited to the individual chapter 7 debtor. Chapter 7
bankruptcies account for a majority of all bankruptcies, with over a million cases
filed
in
the
calendar
year
ending
September
30,
2011.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/
2011/0911_f2.pdf (last visited 1/30/13).
2
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. State of Minn., 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910).
3
Song title used by the Blue-Eyed Devils, JJ Muggler and the Killer Dwarfs.
4
11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(B)(i) (avoidable transfer if within 2 years of filing the
debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value and was insolvent at time).
5
11 U.S.C. §543(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (fraud is presumed for luxury goods greater than
$600 in 90 days); (C)(i)(II) (advances greater than $875 in 70 days); Grogan v.
Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (burden in 523(a) cases is preponderance).
6
11 U.S.C. §542(e); But see, In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923) (stating that when
a debtor loses control of the documents, the privilege against self-incrimination does
not apply).
7
11 U.S.C. §542(e) (Subject to any applicable privilege, debtor must turn over
financial documents); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1922) (privilege applies
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forms she prepared, and she will not be told about it. She imagines she must do
whatever the trustee says to get a discharge including appearing and testifying at
the meeting of creditors.
The background that gives rise to the incriminating facts are that Sophie’s
husband is authorized on Sophie’s credit card. While Hank was having an affair
with Corrie Delecti, he gave money to Corrie from cash advances on Sophie’s
credit card. Hank also bought Corrie jewelry using Sophie’s credit card. The
transactions occurred before Sophie filed bankruptcy and without her knowledge
or consent. The bill arrives after Sophie files bankruptcy so the transactions are
not listed in the filing. When confronted, Hank confesses to the affair and the
credit card charges. He tells Sophie the money and jewelry are in Sophie’s
apartment. Then he leaves.
Corrie Delecti is murdered and Sophie realizes that she was in Corrie’s
apartment building at the time of Corrie’s death. Sophie had dropped by to see a
friend who was not at home. Sophie’s friend lives across the hall from Corrie’s
apartment. Corrie was the neighbor who told Sophie that her friend was out. An
eyewitness saw Sophie in the hall outside Corrie’s apartment near the time of the
murder, but neither the police nor Sophie know this. The witness left that night
and returned home to a rural area in another state.
The Hard Luck Town CSI forensics team finds no evidence to link anyone
specifically to the crime. Sophie has no way to establish her innocence. She has
a conviction 6 years ago for assaulting a woman who flirted with Hank in a bar.8
She is truly innocent, but she is at risk to be indicted, tried, and wrongfully
convicted because of her presence at the scene of the crime with the means,
motive and opportunity, and because of her criminal record.9 In addition, her
discharge may be denied unless she learns of the privilege, asserts it
unambiguously, and insists on immunity before testifying at the 341 meeting.10

equally to criminal and civil/bankruptcy proceedings); (Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892) (privilege is not limited to criminal cases)).
8
Sophie prior conviction may or may not be admissible. Evidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. FED.
R. EVID. 404
9
For purposes of indictment, prosecutors are not required to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury and defense counsel may not be allowed to present their
own evidence. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52 (1992).
10
For purposes of this article, “invocation” and “proper assertion” will be used
interchangeably. A proper assertion is distinguishable from an assertion in that a
proper assertion must be unambiguous. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250,
2263-64 (2010). See also 11 U.S.C. §727(a)(12) (global objection to discharge
related to §522(q)(1)(A) (Debtor has been convicted of a felony which, under the
circumstances, demonstrates that the filing of the case was an abuse of the provisions
of this title) and (q)(1)(B)(iv) (Debtor owes a debt arising from any criminal act . . .
that caused serious physical injury or death to another individual in the preceding 5

6

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. ___: ___

At the time of questioning, she is not a suspect in a capital crime, but she is
aware that her own testimony could lead to her arrest and conviction.11 It is
ironic that while Sophie will not be told of the privilege, she will be informed of
credit counseling requirements, the chapters of bankruptcy available, bankruptcy
crimes and penalties, the availability of the papers she files for inspection by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the risk of dismissal if she fails to file her
financial information on time.12 If Sophie is not cooperative, the trustee will
object to discharge and may request immunity to compel her testimony.
In sum, media reports reveal to Sophie that her responses will place her at
the scene of the horrific crime with means, motive, opportunity, and no alibi.
The circumstantial evidence is strong enough to arrest, indict, and possibly
convict her.13 Sophie knows that a person unknown to her has murdered her
husband’s mistress only minutes after Sophie was in the hallway of the victim’s
apartment building to drop in on a friend who was not at home.
She does not know whether the police forensics team has been able to find
any evidence to further the investigation, or whether there are any leads. She has
no prior experience or training in investigatory work; however, she is intelligent
enough to know that any attempts on her part to solve the case could implicate
her further. Sophie is truly innocent but at risk of being indicted, tried, and
wrongfully convicted while having her bankruptcy blocked because she is
unaware of her Fifth Amendment right to the privilege against self-incrimination
and how to properly assert it to protect herself.14
If she were aware of the privilege, she would invoke the privilege because
there is evidence to link her to commission of the crime. If she were represented
and shared her fear of incrimination with her attorney, in all likelihood she
would be advised to invoke the privilege because her responses will be
incriminating. Because she is pro se, she is far more likely to be frightened at the
prospect of refusing to respond to questioning without knowledge of the
potential consequences, even when she knows her responses will be
incriminating.

years.)). See 18 USC §3156(a)(3) (a felony is an offense that carries imprisonment
of greater than one year); §522(q)(1)(B)(4) (debts for criminal acts or physical injury
causing death within 5 years of filing).
11
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) (a person may assert the privilege at trial
of the accused despite her claim of innocence when she has “reasonable cause to
apprehend danger from her answers”).
12
11 U.S.C. §362(b) (requiring clerks to furnish all debtors with Official Form
B201A (notices to consumer debtors) and §527(a)(1)(requiring debt relief agents to
provide Official Form B201A to “assisted persons”). For definition of “assisted
persons,” see §101(3) (debtors with greater than $175,750 in non-exempt assets)
(selected dollar amounts in the Code will change as of 4/1/2013).
13
See supra note 129.
14
11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(12).
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If she were competently represented, her attorney would advise her that her
failure to unambiguously invoke her privilege would result in the loss of the
privilege. The plight of the debtor is that she has few choices. She must testify
under oath and incriminate herself in a way that may lead to her arrest and
wrongful conviction, or assert her privilege. Her only other choice would be to
perjure herself. If she were represented, her attorney would advise her that, if
she testifies, she must speak truthfully even if her testimony is incriminatory, and
that perjury is not an option.15 Thus, she logically would not speak and
unknowingly waive her privilege because she would know its importance.
Likewise, she would redact incriminating information from any required
schedules.16
In short, while it is clear that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination17 applies to debtors in bankruptcy,18 the debtor may unwittingly
waive her rights and incriminate herself by failing to properly invoke the
privilege.19 For this reason, the pro se debtor and the debtor with representation
each need notice of the constitutional protection so that they are aware of the
consequences of both invocation and waiver of the privilege. The possibility of
a Debtor’s failure to properly invoke the privilege is made more probable

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), 3.3, 4.1, 8.4, but see 1.6
(Discussion Draft 1983). Under the rules,
a disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If . . . in . .
. a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that
limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a
need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements
should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.6 Comment, (DISCLOSURE ADVERSE TO
CLIENT at para. 14.) 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1994).
16 Appendix A shows a mock transcript of the first meeting of creditors and
reveals the colloquy between Sophie and the trustee. See infra notes 154 and 218.
17
11 U.S.C. § 101-1532 (2006). At the outset the author wishes to clarify the
term privilege. The use of the term privilege and all related terms, pertains to the
privilege against self-incrimination unless otherwise indicated.
18
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017 (making the
Federal Rules of Evidence applicable in bankruptcy including FED. R. CIV. P. 43, 44
and 44.1); FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that, except as required by the Constitution,
federal statute, or rules of the Court, the privilege of a person is governed by the
principles of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience; however, in civil litigation where State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege is determined in accordance with State law.).
19
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (citing United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931) (overruled on other grounds in Murphy v.
Waterfront Com’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1983))).
15
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because there is no requirement that debtors be told about the privilege prior to
filing or interrogation.20
A debtor may lose the privilege based on a waiver inferred from her course
of conduct or prior statements concerning a matter,21 whether or not the waiver is
knowing and intelligent.22 This may be true even when counsel fails to advise
the debtor to refuse to answer, 23 and the debtor is unaware at the time that the
statements may be incriminating. 24 Once the debtor testifies, she may have
waived the privilege for later proceedings as to all matters within the scope of
her testimony. 25
Without any requirement of notice, there is no application of the
exclusionary rule in civil proceedings.26 In short, the privilege must be invoked
through its unambiguous assertion in bankruptcy, or it is lost.27 This poses
special dangers and challenges for pro se debtors, who comprise an increasing
percentage of total consumer filings and who are particularly at risk because of
the complexity of the proceedings and the exposure to criminal liability.28 The
debtor who is represented is also placed at risk, to the extent she may not be
properly advised.29

20

Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976) (holding that a knowing
and intelligent waiver is not required in a noncustodial setting).
21
Rivoli Grain Co. v. Litton (In re Litton), 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1987).
22
Horowitz v. Sheldon (In re Donald Sheldon & Co.), 193 B.R. 152, 162
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)).
23
In re A&L Oil Co., Inc., 200 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996).
24
In re Cotillion Investments, Inc., 343 B.R. 344, 351-52 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2006).
25
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 428 (1983).
26
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051
(1984).
27
It is important to distinguish in this context between violations of the
“privilege” and violations of the “right” against self-incrimination. The evidentiary
privilege is violated when having been properly invoked disclosure of incriminating
information is compelled in a setting in which no criminal penalties may attach. The
constitutional right against self-incrimination is violated when privileged
information is unprotected whether through non-disclosure or suppression in a
setting that subjects the person to the threat of imprisonment or other criminal
penalties. 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1036 (1965).
28
Filing for Bankruptcy Without an Attorney, U.S. Administrative Office of the
Courts, Bankruptcy Resources available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts
/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyResources/FilingBankruptcy WithoutAttorney.aspx (last
visited 1/30/13).
29
See supra note 9. And, see In re Cotillion Investments, Inc., 343 B.R. 344
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
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To secure the just determination of every case30 and protect the debtor’s
privilege, the Court, under its rulemaking authority,31 should adopt a revised
Official Form B201A32 for use in consumer bankruptcy cases. The revised form
would provide pre-filing notice in writing of the privilege against selfincrimination. To accomplish this, the Judicial Conference of the United States
should promulgate the proposed form pursuant to its rulemaking authority.33
This simple change would serve to make the debtor aware of the privilege prior
to filing and the consequences of invocation and waiver, so that the privilege
would not be lost through ignorance, inadvertence, or lack of competent counsel.
This comports with the federal requirement of disclosure of the privilege in civil
actions for the assessment of penalties for possession of small amounts of certain
controlled substances.34
Although the existing notices listed in Official Form B201A require
statutory authority,35 notice of the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination needs no specific statutory authority, because the Court may act
under the inherent power of its rulemaking authority.36 This is consistent with
the federal requirement of disclosure of the privilege in civil actions.37
The debtor in bankruptcy should receive written notice of the privilege
against self-incrimination and acknowledge reading it prior to filing. This article

30

FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006); U.S. CONST. Art. 3, § 1 (2012).
32
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2006); See Official Form B201A (providing notice of
certain statutorily required information); See infra Part IV.A.1.
33
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 (2012).
34
21 U.S.C. §844a(e) (2006), as implemented through 28 C.F.R. §§ 76.4, 76.6,
and 76.9. The logical inference is that if Congress and the President through
enabling legislation and administrative policy can provide notice of a constitutional
privilege in a civil proceeding, the Court may do no less. For articles on the inherent
rulemaking authority of courts see James R. Wolf, Inherent Rulemaking Authority of
an Independent Judiciary, 56 U. Miami L. Rev. 507 (2002); A. Leo Levin &
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1958); and Roscoe Pound,
Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 34 (1952).
35
11 U.S.C. §342(b).
36
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (“[G]uided by
considerations of justice,” and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts
may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or the Congress.); See supra note 20.
37
U.S. v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing that SEC
Form 1662 provides notice that such voluntary testimony will be provided to U.S.
attorneys on a routine basis and may be used in civil or criminal proceedings.); and
IRS Form 8300 (providing that “we may also provide the records to appropriate
state, local, and foreign criminal law enforcement and regulatory personnel in the
performance of their official duties.”); See supra note 20.
31
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has four parts. Part I analyzes the scope and application of the privilege and
distinguishes the privilege in bankruptcy from its counterpart in the custodial
setting. Part II examines the increased risk to the pro se debtor and the value of
the privilege to the truly innocent who are seemingly guilty, and the
presumptively innocent, regardless of guilt. Part III explores the plight of the
debtor under current law and explains the risk of nondisclosure of the privilege.
Finally, Part IV proposes a change in the language of Official Form B201A to
alleviate the problems caused by nondisclosure.38 In short, the author’s thesis is
that only through the pre-filing delivery of notice will the debtor's right to the
privilege be meaningful.
I.

THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY

A. The Privilege in American Jurisprudence
The historical origin of the privilege is obscure.39 Under English case law,
the privilege against self-incrimination was a common-law privilege.40 As
English case law developed, the privilege applied only when there appeared
some possibility of incrimination as a result of being compelled to answer.41 The
privilege did not apply to bankruptcy proceedings.42
The early American framers constitutionalized the privilege in the Fifth
Amendment as a part of the Bill of Rights in 1791.43 The Court in Burr
recognized the privilege and acknowledged that the protection it afforded
permitted a person to refuse to give a response to a question that could lead to
incriminating evidence. 44 The privilege, when properly invoked, protected the

38

Official Form B201A; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 342(b).
The historical development of the privilege at English common law is outside
the scope of this article. Some scholars link the origins of the English common law
privilege to the constitutional struggles in the latter half of the seventeenth century
that resulted in the abolition of the courts of Star Chamber and High Commission,
while others maintain that the true origins of the common law privilege are
attributable to the work of defense counsel during the rise of adversary criminal
procedure at the end of the eighteenth century. See Joseph H. Langbein, The
Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92
Mich. L. Rev. 1047 (1994).
40
Re Cossens, 1 Buck. 531 (1820).
41
Regina v. Boyes, 1 Best & S. 311 (1861, Q.B.) For a discussion of the
historical development of the privilege in England, see LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING AND
KERR, Criminal Procedure § 2.10(c) (3d Ed.).
42
Re Smith, 2 Deac. & Chit. 230 (1833); Re Cossens, 1 Buck 531.
43
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44
United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 38, 41 (No. 14,692E) (D. Va.) (1807), (J.
Marshall held that the reach of the Fifth Amendment was so broad as to make the
39
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suspect, the criminal defendant, and the civil litigant from forced compulsion of
incriminating evidence.45 It also protected persons in criminal and civil
proceedings by requiring a grant of immunity as a predicate for the surrender of
the privilege. 46 Although some states had bankruptcy laws, Congress did not
exercise its power47 to enact a permanent bankruptcy system48 until 1898.49
The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, or “the Act”, required the debtor to
testify but provided for a limited form of immunity,50 preventing the use of
incriminating testimony, except in a hearing on objections to discharge.51 The
immunity did not protect documents that may have been produced, 52 perjury and
false oaths,53 or the fruits of the debtor’s testimony.54 Because the immunity
provided was not coextensive with the privilege granted by Counselman,55 the
debtor could not be forced to give incriminating testimony.56

privilege applicable when there was a mere possibility of a criminal charge being
made).
45
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562-3 (1892) (holding that the
privilege protects a person called to testify before a grand jury, even though that
person is not the accused, since grand jury is part of a “criminal case”) (overruled in
part by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)). The reasoning, or dicta, in
Counselman extended the privilege to other judicial proceedings even if not part of a
“criminal case”.
46
Id.
47
U.S. CONST. art. VI. §2; U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 4.
48
Earlier Acts lasted only briefly. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19,
repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5
Stat. 440, repealed by Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; Bankruptcy Act of
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, amended by Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178,
repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 170, 20 Stat. 99.
49
The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended,
sometimes called the Nelson Act, repealed by Pub.L. No. 95-598.
50
Id. at §7a(10).
51
Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913).
52
Ex Parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 93 (1923).
53
Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636, 646 (8th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 205
U.S. 543 (1907).
54
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, §3-344 (16th ed. 2012).
55
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892) (reasoning that no
statute that leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the
criminating question can supplant the privilege and holding that to be valid, a statute
must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which
the question relates).
56
In re Nachman, 114 F. 995, 997 (D.S.C. 1902).
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B. The Privilege in the Modern Era
By the early twentieth century, American case law had developed so that
the privilege against self-incrimination applied in bankruptcy proceedings.57
Eventually, the Act was amended to provide that immunity not only applied to
testimony, but to evidence “directly or indirectly derived from such testimony”.58
The Court developed a standard requiring that the privilege protect an individual
when she reasonably believes a disclosure could be used in a criminal
prosecution.59 The application and scope of the privilege in the various aspects
of the bankruptcy process will be more closely examined in Part III.60
The debtor in bankruptcy, like persons in other civil proceedings, does not
enjoy the same protections afforded by the privilege to those in criminal
proceedings.61 Nevertheless, if the debtor is interrogated about matters that could
prove incriminating, she may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination62
and insist on immunity before answering.63
C. The Privilege in Varying Contexts
The differences between the privilege in the custodial or criminal setting
versus the bankruptcy setting, create special challenges for debtors as clearly
shown when contrasted with the person who is in a custodial, or criminal,
setting.64 The Court in the custodial setting seeks to ensure that any waiver of
the privilege be knowing and intelligent by requiring that Miranda rights be

57
Counselman, 142 U.S. 547; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); In re Rosser, 96 F. 305, 308 (E.D. Mo. 1899).
CRAIG PEYTON GAUMER and CHARLES L. NAIL, JR., Truth of Consequences: The
Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 501 (1997).
58
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), 18 U.S.C. 6002 (§207 of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970). See United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893
(5th Cir. 1972) (pre-amendment case upholding conviction despite Defendant’s
argument that §7a(10) prior to the amendment was unconstitutional, and holding that
Congress had power to grant restricted immunity to witnesses who fail to invoke the
privilege).
59
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
60
See infra Part III.
61
See e.g. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (an individual under
custodial interrogation is entitled to warning (notice) of her right to remain silent or
end questioning and her right to an attorney); See also LAURENT SACHAROFF,
Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535 (2012).
62
See supra note 3.
63
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
64
The use of the terms “custodial” and “criminal” will be used interchangeably
for purposes of the article.
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given.65 If the Miranda rights are not given, a presumption of compulsion arises
that may lead to the suppression of any evidence obtained under the exclusionary
rule.66
The Court has held that a person in the criminal context, who is subject to
custodial interrogation, must be told of her rights under the Fifth Amendment
against self-incrimination before she can waive those rights.67 The burden is on
the state to establish the voluntariness of the waiver. 68 Although the debtor is
required to appear at various times throughout the bankruptcy process, and is
subject to questioning,69 she is not entitled to Miranda warnings at any time
during the proceedings.70 For this reason, the debtor may be unaware when she

65

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966) (Interrogation is custodial if it occurs while
the individual is “in custody at the [police] station or otherwise deprived of his
freedoms of action in any significant way.”) (emphasis added). If the interrogation is
custodial:
[h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.
Id at 479.
66
Id., at 460-65.
67
Id., at 444.
68
Id. Waiver of the privilege appears in a variety of contexts requiring the
court’s judgment. Compare Estelle v. Smith 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (“A criminal
defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce
any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his
statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding.”); with
Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1048, 1417 (holding that the Fifth Amendment was
still relevant as to a psychiatrist called by the defense but it did not warrant habeas
relief).
69
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006) (“. . . The trustee shall orally examine the debtor. . .”)
(emphasis added).
70
See United States v. Jackson, 836 F.2d 324, 327 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
a debtor who was convicted of giving false oaths at bankruptcy proceedings and
concealing creditor’s collateral, was not entitled to Miranda warnings during the
bankruptcy proceedings). Furthermore, other courts have held that a person is not
"in custody" for Miranda purposes merely because of his compelled appearance at a
judicial proceeding to give testimony. See e.g. United States v. Melendez, 228 F.3d
19, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) (hearing on motion to dismiss criminal charges of another
person); United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 410 (1st Cir. 1998) (criminal trial of
another); United States v. Kilgroe, 959 F.2d 802, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1992) (criminal
trial of another); United States v. Vecchiarello, 569 F.2d 656, 664-65 (D.C. Cir
1977) (depositions); Unites States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(interrogation by the House Judiciary Committee); United States v. Pommerening,
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files her bankruptcy petition and schedules, or when she testifies at any point in
the bankruptcy proceedings, that she is potentially opening herself up to criminal
liability through waiver of the privilege. Therefore, the pro se debtor and the
bankruptcy practitioner must become aware of the dangers debtors may face
when considering filing bankruptcy.71
D. The Privilege in Bankruptcy Proceedings
In the early years of the republic, the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination was held to exist whenever there was the mere possibility of
incrimination.72 The literal wording of the constitutional provision states: “No
person… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
. . .”73 Prior to Miranda, there was no obligation to advise a person in either the
criminal or civil setting; the privilege, once invoked, was equally protective in
both.74
However, today the invoked privilege against self-incrimination in
bankruptcy is not the equal of its custodial counterpart.75

500 F.2d 92, 99-100 (10th Cir. 1974) (grand jury witnesses); State v. Cathey, 741
P.2d 738, 743 (Kan. 1987) (inquisition hearing) (overruled on other grounds in State
v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 78 (Kan. 2006)); State v. Tonzola, 621 A.2d 243, 247
(Vt. 1993) (“inquest” procedure to investigate crime).
71
One reason bankruptcy practitioners may be unaware of the debtor’s right to
invoke the privilege is because many do not practice criminal law. See infra note
225.
72
United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 38, 41 (No. 14,692E) (D. Va.) (1807).
73
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
74
The pre-Miranda privilege was "equally protective" in the civil and criminal
settings in that (1) notice was not required prior to interrogation, (2) transactional
immunity was required in either context to compel testimony (Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892)), and (3) no adverse inference could be drawn
from silence. Counselman would not be overruled until 1972 when Kastigar
changed the type of immunity required. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
452-53 (1972). The privilege would be eroded further in 1976 when Baxter allowed
an adverse inference to be drawn from silence in civil cases. Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
75
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (holding Constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination applicable to civil as well as criminal
proceedings); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 452-53 (holding immunity from use and
derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege and is sufficient to
compel testimony over claim of privilege; in any subsequent criminal prosecution,
the prosecution has the burden of proving affirmatively that evidence proposed to be
used is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of compelled
testimony). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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With the passage of time, the privilege in the criminal setting has evolved
into a more robust right, requiring a “knowing and intelligent” waiver.76
Miranda strengthened the presumption of compulsion on failure to warn and the
application of the exclusionary rule.77 In contrast, its civil counterpart has
atrophied to the point that a knowing and intelligent waiver is not required.
Instead, waiver may be inferred from prior unwarned conduct or testimony.78
E. Types of Immunity
Immunity is a term of art in the law, with many nuanced meanings
dependent on context.79 The forms that are relevant in this context are
transactional immunity, use immunity, and derivative use immunity. Immunity
acts like a dam, holding back compelled testimonial information from use in a
criminal prosecution while allowing the regulated release of that same
privileged information in other settings. Historically, immunity is the price the
sovereign must pay for the forfeiture of the privilege.
1. Transactional Immunity
As the term implies, transactional immunity is a grant of immunity that
shields the witness from any exposure to criminal liability related to a particular
transaction.80 In other words, the witness, having been given transactional
immunity and compelled to testify, cannot thereafter be charged, prosecuted,
convicted, or punished for any related matters despite the fact that the witness’s
guilt could be established without use of the witness’s testimony or the fruits of
that testimony. Thus, the price paid for the forfeiture of the privilege is the
sovereign’s guarantee that the witness is protected from exposure to criminal
liability regarding the particular transaction. For that reason, the witness’s
constitutional right to the privilege is not violated because the immunity removes
the potential criminality and renders testimony that would otherwise be
incriminating innocuous in a criminal context.81

76

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Id. at 462.
78
Rivoli Grain Co. v. Litton (In re Litton), 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1987); Horowitz v. Sheldon (In re Donald Sheldon & Co.), 193 B.R. 152, 162
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)).
79
Congressional immunity, sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity, and
judicial immunity are beyond the scope of this article. Though each could touch the
realm of bankruptcy practice, none lie at the heart of the author’s thesis.
80
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
81
Id.
77
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2. Use Immunity
Use immunity is more limited than transactional immunity in that the
witness is protected only from the “use” of the witness’ testimony in any
criminal proceeding against the witness. In other words, if the state has
sufficient evidence apart from the testimony compelled of the witness following
the grant of immunity, the witness may be tried with that evidence. The burden
is on the state to establish that the evidence adduced does not use the quarantined
testimony.82 To the extent that use immunity rather than transactional immunity
will suffice as the state’s “payment” to eliminate the debtor’s privilege, the value
of the privilege is reduced because of the degree to which protection from
criminal prosecution is lost.83
3. Derivative Use Immunity
Closely related to use immunity is derivative use immunity. Derivative use
immunity denies the state the use of evidence that is derived from the witness’
testimony. Thus, the “fruits” of the immunized testimony are forbidden fruits
that may not be used in a criminal proceeding against the witness.84
Over time, the Supreme Court has altered the type of immunity necessary to
compel testimony in the face of a proper assertion of the privilege. As examined
below in Part III(E), the Court, over the course of history, has moved from a rule
mandating transactional immunity in exchange for “immunized testimony” to a
rule permitting the compulsion of privileged testimony through a grant of use
immunity and derivative use immunity.85 The implications of the Court’s

82

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964).
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 466-67 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“When we allow the prosecution to offer only ‘use’ immunity we allow
it to grant far less than it has taken away. For while the precise testimony that is
compelled may not be used, leads from that testimony may be pursued and used to
convict the witness.”).
84
Murphy, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
85
While the United States Supreme Court has held that use and derivative use
immunity are sufficient, some state courts do more than the Federal Constitution and
require transactional immunity. See Pratt v. Kirkpatrick, 718 P.2d 962 (Alaska
1986); Steinberger v. District Court, In and For Tenth Judicial Dist., 596 P.2d 755
(Colo. 1979); State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d 915 (Haw. 1980); People ex rel. Cruz v.
Fitzgerald, 363 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. 1977); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 516
A.2d 976 (Md. 1986); Matter of Pressman, 658 N.E.2d 156 (Mass. 1995); People v.
McIntire, 599 N.W.2d 102 (Mich. 1999); State v. Charest, 336 N.W.2d 303 (Minn.
1983); Kelly v. Grand Jury of Lewis and Clark County, 552 P.2d 1399 (Mont.
1976); People v. Chin, 490 N.E.2d 505 (1986); State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan, 629
N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 1994); State v. Bertoldi, 495 A.2d 247 (R.I. 1985); State v.
Runions, 665 P.2d 1358 (1983); State v. Cottrill, 511 S.E.2d 488 (W. Va. 1998).
83
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decisions affect debtors, debtors’ counsel, and the courts in dramatically
different ways.
Because transactional immunity is no longer required to compel testimony
over an assertion of the privilege, debtors remain at risk of prosecution after the
compulsion of testimony. Instead, the Court has held that use and derivative use
immunity is sufficient.86 As a result, in the words of Justice Brennan, “. . . .use
immunity literally misses half the point of the privilege, for it permits the
compulsion without removing the criminality.”87 In short, the modern day
privilege against self-incrimination in the bankruptcy setting is an anemic distant
cousin of its former self.
F. Two Privileges from One Right
Clearly, two distinct privileges have emerged from one fundamental
constitutional right. In the criminal setting, notice of the privilege must be given;
waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent; and no adverse inference
may be drawn from an invocation of the privilege. In the civil setting, notice
need not be given; waiver need not be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; and
an adverse inference may be drawn. As important as these differences are to
judges, attorneys, and academics, it has the greatest impact on the civil litigant to
whom no explanation is required. This is particularly true of the debtor in
chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings for at least three reasons: (1) the debtor’s
inability to voluntarily dismiss the proceedings;88 (2) the debtor’s forfeiture of
ownership of books, records, and documents to the trustee as custodian of the
estate;89 and (3) the inference of waiver of the privilege that arises from the filing
of statements and schedules with the petition.90
The pro se debtor and the debtor with representation each need notice of the
privilege, its scope, and its limitations no less than those who are subject to

86

Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462 (1972).
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 567 (1971) (dissenting).
88
In re Bartee, 317 B.R. 362, 366 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (chapter 7 suit must be
dismissed for cause). Chapter 11 debtors must also establish cause for a dismissal of
their suit. 11 U.S.C. § 1107; In re Helmers, Bkrtcy.D.Kan.2007, 361 B.R. 190.
Chapter 12 and 13 debtors are given an absolute right to dismissal by statute, but the
Eighth Circuit has held that a trustee may convert the case to chapter 7 (thereby
requiring a show of cause) even after the debtor has moved for dismissal. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1208; 11 U.S.C. §1307; In re Graven, 936 F.2d 378, 387 (8th Cir. 1991); and In re
Molitor, 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1996).
89
Ex Parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 94 (1923) (holding that where the debtor is
required to deliver books and papers in the bankruptcy proceedings, she is not
privileged under the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment).
90
Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 549 (1932).
87
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custodial interrogation.91 The constitutional protection intended for the benefit
of all citizens is at risk when the existence of the privilege remains undisclosed.
The value of the right against self-incrimination is implicated when the debtor is
unaware of its existence. Without appropriate disclosures to the debtor regarding
proper invocation, the possibility of inferred waiver of the privilege, and the
consequences that flow from both invocation and waiver, the privilege serves no
purpose.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIVILEGE
A. The Rise of the Pro Se Debtor in Bankruptcy
Over the last five years, the rate of pro se bankruptcy filings grew much
faster than the rate of growth of overall bankruptcy filings, particularly in the
western part of the United States.92 Non-pro se bankruptcy petitions rose 98
percent over the last five years, while pro se filings grew 187 percent over the
same time period. Pro se chapter 7 (liquidation) filings jumped 208 percent, and
pro se chapter 13 (reorganization) filings were up 189 percent. Between 2007
and 2011, pro se chapter 7 filings increased from 6 percent to 8 percent and the
pro se chapter 13 filings increased from 6 percent to 10 percent.93
To give these percentages real meaning, it is worthwhile to convert the
percentages to raw numbers. For the period ending in June 2011 there were just
over one million consumer chapter 7 bankruptcies.94 The 8 percent figure
represents nearly 84,000 pro se chapter 7 debtors in one year. Ten percent of all
chapter 13 filings constituted nearly 43,000 during that same time period.
Together, the total number of filings by pro se debtors has swollen to over
125,000 per year. Notably, this increase in pro se filings as a percentage of all
filings occurred during a period when the total number of annual bankruptcy
filings doubled.95

91
The many scenarios under which the need for the privilege may arise are so
varied that the scope of this article cannot extend to all. See United States v. Greer,
631 F.3d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1841 (U.S. 2011) (tattoo is
“testimonial” such that the privilege against self-incrimination could apply).
92
The Third Branch, By the Numbers--Pro Se Filers in the Bankruptcy Courts,
Administrative
Office
of
the
U.S.
Courts
(2011)
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-10-01/By_the_Numbers-Pro_Se_Filers_in_the_Bankruptcy_Courts.aspx (last visited 2/1/13).
93
Id.
94
The total number was 1,047,131. Id.
95
The total number of bankruptcy filings for the period ending June 2007 was
751,056, while the same total for the period ending June 2011 was 1,529,560.
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last visited 2/1/13)

2013]

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY

19

The effect of this dramatic increase is not spread evenly around the
country.96 There appears to be some correlation between pro se filings and areas
with reduced family income.97 For example, pro se filings in the Central District
of California represented 27.1 percent of all filings,98 while in the Eastern
District of California pro se filings were 16.5 percent of all filings.99 In Arizona,
pro se filings comprised 20.8 percent of all filings.100
B. Protecting the Innocent
Many categories of people must be considered in the protection of
Americans from the loss of hard-won liberties. The clearly guilty individual
who must remain presumptively innocent and the truly innocent person, who is
only seemingly guilty, must both be protected.101 The rights of each must be
guarded by the attorney-client privilege from the public disclosure of her

96
The Third Branch, By the Numbers--Pro Se Filers in the Bankruptcy Courts,
Administrative
Office
of
the
U.S.
Courts
(2011)
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-10-01/By_the_Numbers-Pro_Se_Filers_in_the_Bankruptcy_Courts.aspx (last visited 2/1/13) (map showing
percentage grouping of bankruptcy cases filed pro se by color).
97
Ronald Brownstein and Scott Bland, The Geography of Pain, The National
Journal (updated September 30, 2011) http://www.nationaljournal.com/
magazine/census-sheds-new-light-on-toll-of-great-recession-20110929 (last visited
2/1/13): Twenty states saw their median family incomes plummet at least a dizzying
5 percent over those two years [2008-2010]. The largest losses were clustered in the
twin poles of Sun Belt and Rust Belt states: on the one hand, Arizona, Georgia,
Florida, Nevada, Alabama, North Carolina, California, and South Carolina; on the
other, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio. (Oregon was the only state among the dozen
largest losers that is not in either the Sun Belt or the Rust Belt.) A more diverse list
of 17 other states lost between 3 and 5 percent of median family income. Id.
98
There were 39,478 pro se filings in the Central District of California out of a
total of 145,741 consumer filings. Id.
99
There were 8,877 pro se filings compared to 53,888 total consumer filings in
the Eastern District of California. The Third Branch, By the Numbers--Pro Se Filers
in the Bankruptcy Courts, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (2011) available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-10-01/By_the_Numbers-Pro_Se_Filers_in_the_Bankruptcy_Courts.aspx (last visited 2/1/13) (map showing
percentage grouping of bankruptcy cases filed pro se by color).
100
In Arizona there were 8,625 pro se filings among the 41,377 total consumer
filings. Id.
101
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there
is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.”).
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admissions to counsel.102 Regardless of whether she is guilty or innocent, her
privilege against self-incrimination must be preserved through proper invocation,
if necessary.103 She must not be subjected to interrogation tactics that rob her of
her right to remain silent and her right to stop the questioning.104 She must
remain innocent until she decides to waive her rights and enter a voluntary plea,
or demand a trial at which her peers will weigh whether the state has proven each
element of any charges beyond a reasonable doubt.105
Protection of the rights of the clearly guilty in a criminal situation is often
the easier problem for counsel, because the guilty often realize they need to
exercise every legal right available to them.106 Thus, the desire for and value of
the evidentiary privilege is clear and urgent. The guilty client may seek counsel
before there is a real threat of arrest or prosecution. As the book of Proverbs
says: “The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the righteous are bold as a
lion.”107 Fear is a powerful motivator, and those who believe themselves to be in
violation of the law are more likely to seek to protect themselves, whether
through concealment, flight, or legal counsel. On the other hand, it is equally
true that the righteous or innocent are bold. They are apt to be far less cautious
because they have no reason to suspect they are being pursued, making them all
the more vulnerable.108
And so though it may seem ironic, the truly innocent person is on the
continuum of those whose rights need protecting.109 This is true, not because of
what she has done, but because of what someone else may have done. She may
fall prey to the wrongdoer who would use her as a scapegoat. Law enforcement
and vigilantes may target her as a suspect when the true perpetrator is not selfevident. She may be victimized by the ineptitude of investigators who overlook
some clues and misdiagnose others. And, to be sure, she may naively
incriminate herself because of her misplaced confidence in our system of justice

102

FED. R. EVID. 501; See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 386-445 (6th ed. 2006).
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2263-64 (2010) (holding that a
suspect’s Miranda right to remain silent, stop questioning or request counsel must be
invoked “unambiguously”) (citing Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. at 459)).
104
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“[T]he prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”).
105
U.S. CONST. amend. VI .
106
This is true when the criminal conduct remains undiscovered and at all points
in the criminal process.
107
Proverbs 28:1 (King James).
108
See infra note 102.
109
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (A person may assert privilege at trial
of the accused despite her claim of innocence when she has “reasonable cause to
apprehend danger from her answers.”).
103
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and her inability to think like a criminal, a policeman, a prosecutor, or a judge. It
is precisely because the innocent does not feel guilty that she is most vulnerable.
Unlike her guilty counterpart, she feels no need to be guarded in her speech or
conduct, nor does she sense a need for the protection afforded by counsel. In
short, the system ostensibly designed for the protection of the innocent offers
many opportunities for the forfeiture of her rights and liberties.110
When an innocent person does assert her privilege, another danger is the
cultural bias that those who assert the privilege must in fact be guilty.111 From a
modern day perspective, our society may decry the injustices that gave rise to the
privilege.112 Yet, in a collective denial of our own cultural hypocrisy, there is

110

In 2011 in United States District Courts, dismissals and acquittals totaled
8,197 in criminal proceedings. United States Courts, Statistics available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/Judicial
Business2011.pdf 230 (last visited 2/1/13). In 2010 in federal criminal courts, 7,782
cases were dismissed and 415 defendants were acquitted. Dismissals and acquittals
for the five year period beginning in 2005 totaled 41,709. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=one_variable&agency=
AOUSC&db_type=CrimCtCases&saf=OUT (last visited 2/1/13). One explanation
for the number of dismissals and acquittals is that while the suspect originally
appeared guilty, further investigation revealed her innocence. It is logical to assume
that there is a direct relationship between the loss of the privilege and the increased
likelihood of arrest, prosecution, and conviction because, by definition, the suspect is
compelled to provide incriminating evidence against herself. This possibility of
innocence is a key reason that the debtor must be informed of her privilege against
self-incrimination. This need for disclosure is manifest in the number of
exonerations discussed at note 111 infra. We trust the judicial system to convict the
guilty and as a corollary, we trust it to exonerate the innocent. Therefore, if we are
satisfied as a society that those who are found guilty are in fact guilty, despite the
fact that we know some will ultimately be proven innocent, it is logical that we
would trust the system to establish innocence even when we know some of those are
guilty.
111 Consider this internet article.
The article questioned whether Florida
governor Rick Scott had implied his own guilt by claiming the Fifth Amendent as a
TV ad had so accused him of doing.
Politifact Florida, available at
http://www.politifact.
com/florida/statements/2010/oct/12florida-democraticparty/does-rick-scott-invoking-fifth-amendment-imply-gui/ (last visited 3/10/2013).
112
LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING AND KERR, Criminal Procedure § 2.10(c) (3d ed.).
The Court in Miranda noted that the privilege originated in the trial of John Lilburn
who was made to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would have bound
him to answer to all questions posed to him on any subject. He resisted the oath and
declaimed the proceedings, because he believed that “no man’s conscience ought to
be racked by oaths imposed, to answer to questions concerning himself in matters
criminal.” On account of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the inquisitorial
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often a perception of guilt and an expectation that the accused should be
compelled to speak and establish her innocence, or by her silence admit the
truthfulness of the allegations, however damning.113 Society’s expectation that
the innocent person who is accused should speak arises from the perception that
innocence is susceptible to proof. This view prevailed in the courts prior to the
adoption of the privilege and is premised on the idea that only the guilty would
remain silent in the face of the threat of criminal punishment. 114 This
perpetuates the “trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, that the
privilege was designed to avoid.115 The accused must testify, lie, or face the
possibility of contempt or conviction for her silence.
C. The Negative Proof Burden
In a civilized society, most individuals more readily imagine being the
victim of crime than the perpetrator.116 The thought of establishing legal
innocence may not seem frightening. Instead, a person may presume that our
judicial system will protect her,117 as the law goes to great lengths to avoid

Court of Star Chamber. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1966). The
Court also illustrated the fact that custodial interrogation (even without brutality)
takes a heavy toll on individuals with the following examples: In Townsend v. Sain,
the defendant was a 19-year-old heroin addict, described as a ‘near mental
defective.’ The defendant in Lynumn v. State of Illinois, was a woman who
confessed to the arresting officer after being importuned to ‘cooperate’ in order to
prevent her children from being taken by relief authorities. This Court as in those
cases reversed the conviction of a defendant in Haynes v. State of Washington,
whose persistent request during his interrogation was to phone his wife or attorney.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455-56 (1966).
113
Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1327,
1328 (2009) (“Courts should adjust the mix by rewarding defendants more for
testifying and punishing them more for declining to testify.”).
114
LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING AND KERR, Criminal Procedure § 2.10(c) (3d Ed.).
115
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990) (“At its core, the privilege
reflects our fierce ‘unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt. . . .’”).
116
In this context, a civilized society is one governed by the rule of law and in
which most people are law-abiding.
117
In a recent study, 72 participants (first year Psychology students) were
deemed guilty or innocent of a mock theft and were apprehended for investigation.
Motivated to avoid prosecution and trial, they were confronted by a neutral,
sympathetic, or hostile male “detective” who sought a waiver of their Miranda rights.
Participants who were truly innocent were significantly more likely to sign a waiver
than those who were guilty. The study concludes that it was a naive belief in the
power of their innocence to set them free that caused most to waive their rights even
in a hostile detective condition, where the risk of interrogation was apparent. Saul M.
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asking a litigant to prove a negative proposition precisely because of the
admitted difficulty.118
Statutes of limitation and statutes of fraud are examples
of society’s desire to avoid injustice to defendants in civil and criminal
proceedings due to the concerns about the insufficiency of evidence.119
The law and society acknowledge that proving a negative proposition, such
as true innocence, may require much more evidence than proving an affirmative
proposition, such as guilt.120 The danger is the possibility that the accused is
truly innocent, coupled with the magnitude of the harm arising from a wrongful
conviction.121 The privilege protects the truly innocent person whose testimony
would make her appear guilty.122
D. The Presumptively Innocent
The value of the privilege is no less important to the debtor who is obviously
guilty than it is to the debtor who is only seemingly guilty. The privilege
protects the clearly guilty person by preserving the presumption of innocence
and the right to a fair trial.123 The presumption of innocence is critical to
providing fundamental fairness to the accused in a criminal setting. It is
diminished to the extent that the accused is compelled to testify through the
inadvertent loss of the privilege. Because guilt is a legal conclusion that must

Kassin and Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The
Power of Innocence, Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2004).
118
The Burden of Proof is on the civil litigant seeking redress to adduce the
evidence necessary and affirmatively prove the elements of the cause of action or the
criminal action the elements of the crime. Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th
Cir. 1994); Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1975); People v.
Orth, 530 N.E.2d 210, 215 (Ill. 1988); Lublin v. Central Islip Psychiatric Ctr., 372
N.E.2d 307, 310 (N.Y. 1977); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
119
51 AM. JUR. 2D, Limitation of Actions § 9; 73 AM. JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds
§ 425.
120
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 218.
121
Consider Eddie Joe Lloyd, a mentally handicapped man, who falsely
confessed to the rape and murder of a young woman after police led him to believe
that he would smoke out the real killer. Innocence Project, Know the Cases,
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Eddie_Joe_Lloyd.php (last
visited 3/10/2013). See discussion infra at Part II E and notes 109 and 111. See also
NOTORIOUS CASES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION 4.
122 See infra note 111.
123
United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Silence is the
right of the innocent as well as of the guilty.”); De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d
140, 151 (5th Cir. 1962) (“To make the privilege against self-incrimination effective
and to preserve the presumption of innocence, almost all of the states adopted laws
forbidding comment on a defendant's neglect or refusal to testify and decreeing that
no inference should be drawn from his silence.”).
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await the outcome of judicial proceedings, preservation of the privilege is
essential to protect the presumptively innocent. The American legal system is
founded on an accusatorial basis, not inquisitorial.124
E. The Wrongfully Convicted
The risk of wrongful arrest, prosecution, and conviction is real. With
modern day forensics, the number of innocent people who have been wrongfully
convicted is increasingly evident. As of March 11, 2013, the Innocence Project
has exonerated 303 persons through DNA testing in the United States.125 The
Innocence Project details each one of the first 250 DNA exoneration cases and
includes statistics on common causes of the wrongful convictions.126 The
protection of the innocent is inextricably linked to the presumption of innocence
and the privilege against self-incrimination. False confessions and incriminating
statements lead to wrongful conviction in approximately 27 percent of cases.127
Nearly 10% of exonerees pled guilty to crimes they did not commit.128
Wrongful convictions are more likely to occur when an adverse inference is
drawn from exercise of the privilege, causing an innocent person to appear
guilty. Although jurors may be instructed not to consider a defendant’s refusal
to testify, in reality, it is difficult for a jury instruction to override the temptation
to believe that the defendant has something to hide.129
III. THE PLIGHT OF THE DEBTOR IN RETAINING THE PRIVILEGE
Even when the debtor is aware of the privilege, it may be lost at any time
through ignorance and inadvertence. To the extent that debtor is not aware that

124

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
The Innocence Project, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last
visited 3/11/13). See infra note 106.
126
Innocence Project, 250 Exonerated, Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, 1, 51
(2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject_250.
pdf (last visited 2/1/13).
127
Id. at 32-33.
128
Id. See also note 107 infra.
129 In 1980, one study concluded that defendants who appeared to withhold
evidence were judged more harshly, indicating that something (we don’t know what)
goes on in the mind of the jury. E. GIL CLARY AND DAVID R. SHAFFER, Effects of
Evidence Withholding and a Defendant's Prior Record on Juridic Decisions, THE
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 237 (1980). Another study concluded, however,
that pleading the fifth did not have an effect on mock jurors. SHELLEY M. FISCHER
AND LAWRENCE A. FEHR, The Effect Of Defendant's Plea On Mock Juror Decisions,
125 THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 531, 531-33 (1985).
125
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the privilege may be waived, or how it may be waived, the privilege is at risk.
Retaining the privilege is as critical as claiming it.
A. Invocation of the Privilege
During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, a debtor may be exposed
to various instances in which she may be asked to provide incriminating
evidence and the need to invoke the privilege. The Code requires the debtor to
attend a meeting of creditors and be orally examined under oath by a trustee. 130
The debtor must answer questions of creditors at that meeting. The debtor may
also be deposed in a 2004 examination.131 Each of these proceedings is recorded
and the examining party has the right to have the examination reduced to
writing.132
The Bankruptcy Code anticipates the dilemma of the debtor who is asked to
provide incriminating testimony under oath.133 The Code provides that a debtor
may be granted immunity regarding incriminating testimony prior to giving the
testimony.134 If the debtor is granted immunity and persists in refusing to answer
questions, the debtor may be denied a discharge.135 If the debtor is not granted
immunity, she may refuse to testify based on a proper assertion of her privilege
against self-incrimination.136
Although the Code does not specifically define the type or scope of
immunity required to compel the debtor to testify, the Court has held that the
combination of use and derivative use immunity is sufficient.137 Transactional
immunity is not required.138 For these reasons, the debtor needs assistance of
counsel to avoid the pitfalls. Counsel’s explanation of the debtor’s rights and
responsibilities at each juncture protects the debtor against the inadvertent loss of
the privilege.

11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006) (“Immunity for persons required to submit to
examination, to testify, or to provide information in a case under this title may be
granted. . . .”).
131
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 (2012).
132
In re Jackson, 13 F. Cas. 204, 205 (E.D.N.C. 1874).
133
11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006) (Subject to any applicable privilege, the debtor
must turn over financial documents).
134
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
135
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(B) (“the court shall grant a discharge, unless the
debtor has refused in the case, on the ground of self-incrimination, to . . . testify,
after the debtor has been granted immunity with respect to the matter concerning
which such privilege was invoked.”).
136
Krasney v. Nam (In re Gi Yeong Nam), 245 B.R. 216, 224 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2000); In re Potter, 88 B.R. 843 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
137
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 452 (1972).
138
Id.
130
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1. Blanket Invocation is not a “proper assertion”
Though the debtor may wish to properly assert her privilege against selfincrimination, certain requirements must be met for an assertion to be proper.
The privilege may be properly asserted if there is (1) compelled disclosure that is
(2) found to be testimonial and (3) incriminatory.139 A debtor may not use a
blanket invocation of the privilege to refuse to answer all questions in a
proceeding.140 Instead, a debtor must be ready to show, related to each question,
that there is a real danger of incrimination,141 that there is some nexus of risk,142
or that the information provided will provide a link in the chain of information
required for prosecution.143 Furthermore, the debtor must show that the fear of
prosecution is more than fanciful.144
The Supreme Court has recognized that these requirements for invoking
privilege creates a paradox in that, if a witness is required to prove the hazard of
prosecution, she would be compelled to surrender the very information and
protection that the privilege against self-incrimination is designed to protect.145
To avoid this result, some courts have required the debtor to explain the
incriminatory nature of specific questions under oath, in camera, or by

139

In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 430-31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
Id. at 430; accord In re Brandenberg, No. 06-30709, 2007 WL
117391(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan 10, 2007); see also In re ICS Cybertronics, Inc., 107
B.R. 821, 829 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a former officer of a corporation
was not entitled to issue a blanket refusal to testify at an examination under FED. R.
BANKR. P. 2004, but was ordered to answer each question propounded to him unless
he proffered particularized responses to each, explaining some nexus between the
risk of criminal prosecution and the information requested).
141
In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 167 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Mudd, 95 B.R.
426, 427 (Bankr. D. Tex. 1989).
142
Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 634 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1980).
143
In re French, 127 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (holding that a Ch. 11
debtor, charged with a felony, may assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination at the first meeting of creditors without losing her right to
discharge if the debtor is not offered immunity, but must do so as to each question
posed, and that where the questions would potentially furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute, no further inquiry is needed).
144
In re Mart, 90 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (permitting a discharge
where the debtor was potentially involved in her husband’s alleged criminal conduct,
and invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the
fear of prosecution was more than fanciful); see also In re Johnson, 387 B.R. 728
(S.D. Ohio 2008) (denying the debtors a discharge where the debtor purported to
“plead the Fifth” in refusing to answer questions at the first meeting of creditors, but
where there was no fear of prosecution; rather the debtor was blatantly trying to
avoid cooperation with the Trustee).
145
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
140
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affidavit.146 The debtor may not use the privilege as a basis to refuse to attend
the section 341 meeting of creditors147 or to refuse to provide the required
schedules and statement of financial affairs.148
2. The Timing and Consequence of Asserting of the privilege
A debtor may make a proper assertion of her right against self-incrimination
throughout the bankruptcy process.149 She may invoke her right in the
completion of the bankruptcy schedules, during oral testimony, and responding
to requests for production of documents.
However, while the debtor may avoid exposing herself to incrimination
through her direct testimony, she may be subject to other consequences. Among
other things, adverse inferences may be drawn in the bankruptcy proceedings,
adversary proceedings, in Rule 2004 examinations,150 and criminal
proceedings.151

146

In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 445, 447-48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)
In re Russell, 392, B.R. 315, 368 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008).
148
Id at 361.
149
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2253 (2010) (a suspect’s Miranda
right to remain silent, stop questioning or request counsel must be invoked
“unambiguously”) (citing Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. at 459). It must be reasoned that a
civil litigant, including the debtor, in a non-custodial context would not be allowed to
invoke the privilege more easily, and thus the best practice is to invoke the privilege
through an assertion that is unambiguous.
150
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., v. Frenville, 67 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1986) (adverse inferences used to deny dischargability to certain debts where the
debtor asserted the 5th Amendment to questions regarding their dischargability);
Clark & Gregory, Inc. v. Hanson (In re Hanson), 225 B.R. 366, 371 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1986) (Debtor who invoked 5th Amendment privilege throughout the
discovery process for an adversarial proceeding was not allowed to waive such
privilege on the day of trial and testify because of unfair prejudice and surprise.);
Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Sutherlin 109 B.R. 700, 706 (Bankr. E.D. La.
1989) (Receiver was entitled to rely upon and draw a negative inference from
Debtor’s invocation of his 5th Amendment rights during a 2004 examination in
motion to dismiss case.); United States v. (Under Seal) (In re Grand Jury Subpoena),
836 F.2d 1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988) (“the trier of fact may also use the silence of a
deponent for relevant inference that it creates”).
151
Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 549 (1932) (“It is our opinion that defendant, by filing the schedules in
bankruptcy without objection, waived his privilege as to any use to which such
schedules would be put, including evidence in a criminal prosecution.”); See Part
III.B.1 infra.
147
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3. Invocation in the Petition and Schedules
The Code requires that a debtor file a list of creditors, a schedule of assets
and liabilities, a schedule of current income and current expenses, a statement of
the debtor’s financial affairs, and other schedules.152 The Code gives the court
discretion to allow a debtor to omit certain information.153 Historically, courts
have allowed the debtor to refrain from turning over incriminating schedules.154
Courts have held that debtors must complete schedules when there is clearly no
direct and apparent self-incrimination that necessarily attaches to the information
required by the schedules.155 However, if the court finds that the debtor’s refusal
to provide information required by the Code is justified under the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, it may excuse compliance with the
requirement.156
4. Production of Documents
At various times throughout the bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor may be
asked to produce documents related to the bankruptcy estate, which is created by
the filing of the petition.157 Examples of such documents include bank
statements, tax returns, deeds, and titles. As in other types of civil cases, the
Supreme Court has held that the incriminating contents of documents in the
debtor’s possession are not privileged because there has been no compulsion to
create the documents, and the documents were created voluntarily prior to the
request for turnover.158 However, the Court has found that the act of producing
documents itself may be sufficiently testimonial to warrant Fifth Amendment

152

11 U.S.C. § 521; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 1009, 4002, & 9011.
See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B) (2006) (“the debtor shall file a list of creditors;
and unless the court orders otherwise--, [other schedules]”) (emphasis added).
154
See e.g., In re Kanter, 117 F. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1902); In re U. S. Hoffman
Can Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 629 (3d Cir. 1967).
155
See e.g., In re Arend, 286 F. 516, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1922); Padolin v. Lesher
Warner Dry Goods Co., 210 F. 97, 102-04 (3d Cir. 1914).
156
In re United States Hoffman Can Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1967);
In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 447-48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Kaufman, 35 B.R.
26, 28 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1983).
157
11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The commencement of a case creates an estate
comprised of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the estate wherever located and by whomever held except as
provided by § 541(b) and (c)(2). The trustee is the representative of the estate. See §
323(a). Pursuant to § 521(a)(4) “[t]he debtor shall…surrender to the trustee all
property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents,
records, and papers, relating to property of the estate, whether or not immunity is
granted under section 344 of this title;” (emphasis supplied).
158
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 n.11 (1976).
153
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protection, notwithstanding that the information in certain documents may
contain incriminating information.159 For instance, by producing the documents,
the debtor may be making admissions that (1) the documents exist, (2) that the
documents are in the possession and control of the debtor, or (3) that the debtor
believes that the documents she produces are the documents that were requested,
thereby authenticating the documents.160 In such a case, a grant of use and
derivative use immunity is required in order to compel the testimony sought.161
The first step in determining whether a debtor may invoke her privilege
against self-incrimination and thus refuse to produce documents is to determine
whether the documents are property of the debtor’s estate.162 The privilege
against self-incrimination only applies to property in which the debtor holds
title.163 If the title to the documents is vested in the bankruptcy estate or another
third party, the debtor may not be able to invoke her privilege to suppress the
documents.164 If the requested documents are property of the bankruptcy estate,
courts have found that the turnover of those assets is not testimonial and is
therefore not in conflict with the privilege against self-incrimination.165

159

United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
160
In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
161
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984); See discussion infra at note 271.
162
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (defining property of the estate); Property claimed as
exempt is property of the estate until the court allows the exemption or the time for
objections to exemptions has lapsed. In re Bucchino, 439 B.R. 761, 770-71 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 2010); In re Campbell, 313 B.R. 313, 320-21 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004); In re
Calvin, 329 B.R. 589, 601-02 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Jimenez, 406 B.R. 935, 940-45 (D.N.M. 2008). For the duration that documents are
property of the estate, the trustee would potentially be able to examine (and even
photocopy) anything incriminating. In those jurisdictions that require the debtor to
have ownership and possession to assert the privilege (see infra notes 169 and 170),
the debtor would not technically be able to assert the privilege in this time period.
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) and FED. R. BANKR. P. 40003(b)(1) for requirement to file
claim of exemptions and procedure for objections.
163
Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1923); In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 92, 93-94
(1923).
164
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4); United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1971); also In re
Lufkin, 255 B.R. 204, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (Debtor-Attorney could not
assert Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to prevent receiver, who had
been appointed to take possession of law firm prior to involuntary bankruptcy, from
disclosing documents to Trustee).
165
In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330, 340-41 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985); In re Deveraux, 48
B.R. 644, 646 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985); In re Crabtree, 39 B.R. 726, 732 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1984); In re Kaufman, 35 B.R. 26, 27-28 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1983).
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Courts disagree on the proper test for deciding whether requested documents
are property of the debtor’s estate for the purpose of asserting the privilege. One
view is that possession alone is sufficient basis for assertion of the privilege.
The other view is that ownership and possession are necessary. For instance, the
Second Circuit has held that ownership of documents is essential to suppress
them on Fifth Amendment grounds.166 In order to rightfully assert her privilege
against self-incrimination, a debtor must show ownership and possession of the
requested documents, and she must show that they are self-incriminatory.167 The
Ninth Circuit has held that possession of the documents by the debtor may be a
necessary and sufficient condition to invoke the privilege.168 That court
reasoned that even if the debtor did not own the requested documents, there is
the same potential for incrimination based on identification, possession, and
authentication.169 However, even if the documents are not property of the estate,
and the debtor is in possession of the documents, the debtor must show that the
act of producing the documents is sufficiently testimonial to warrant Fifth
Amendment protection.170
5. Assertion of the privilege in Oral Testimony
During bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor is expected to give oral
testimony at the meeting of creditors and may be asked to testify at 2004 exams
or certain hearings.171 The debtor may be granted immunity regarding her oral
testimony under part V of title 18 of the United States Code for the purposes of
this examination.172 Neither the Criminal Code nor the Bankruptcy Code
specifies the type of immunity to be granted, but the Court has held that a grant
of use and derivative use immunity is sufficient to compel the debtor to testify
under oath.173
If the debtor is not offered immunity, the debtor may refuse to testify under
the privilege and still retain her right to a discharge.174 The use of the privilege in
chapter 7 consumer cases is well documented.175 However, assertion of the

166

United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id.
168
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967).
169
Id.
170
In re Ross, 156 B.R. 272, 275-77 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
171
11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004.
172
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006). See 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et. Seq. (2006).
173
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
174
11 U.S.C. 727(a)(6)(A); Turner v. Wlodarski (In re Minton Group, Inc.), 43
B.R. 705, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Chrysler Capital Corp v. Salzman (In re
Salzman), 61 B.R. 878, 889 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421at
426 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
175
Turner, 43 B.R. at 709.
167
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privilege in a chapter 13 is problematic because of the requirement that the
debtor’s plan be submitted in good faith.176 Unless immunity is granted the
privilege may be invoked to avoid incriminating questions or offering other
incriminating information considered testimonial whether during discovery or
trial.177 The debtor may invoke the privilege in bankruptcy to justify a refusal to
provide information otherwise relevant to the administration of the estate.178
B. Adverse Consequences
1. Adverse Inferences
Though the debtor may properly assert her privilege to avoid revealing
incriminatory evidence, she may face adverse consequences. When a debtor
invokes her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in civil
proceedings, adverse inferences may be drawn from the invocation179 by
receivers, Trustees, and the Court.180 In some situations, such inferences may
lead to certain debts being deemed nondischargeable.181

176
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3); In re Girdaukas, 92 B.R. 373, 376 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1988) (supporting use of Fifth Amendment in chapter 7, but noting that it may be
difficult for a debtor to establish good faith plan under chapter 13 while using the
Fifth Amendment privilege).
177
Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11 (11th Cir.
1993).
178
In re Hyde, 235 B.R. 539, 542 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
179
See In re Brandenberg, No. 06-30709, 2007 WL 117391(Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
Jan 10, 2007).
180
See United States v. (Under Seal) (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 836 F.2d
1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988) (“the trier of fact may also use the silence of a deponent
for relevant inference that it creates”); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Sutherlin, 109
B.R. 700, 706 (E.D. La. 1989) (stating that a receiver was entitled to draw a negative
inference from the debtor’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights during a Rule
2004 examination and rely upon the inference in its motion to dismiss the case).
181
In re Asbury, Bankr. No. 08-21989, Adversary No. 09-02012, 2011 WL
44911 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (Relying, in part, on a debtor’s assertion of the 5th
Amendment as to false statements regarding assets, in determining that the chapter 7
debts were non-dischargeable under 523(a)(2)(B))); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v.
Frenville, 67 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (adverse inferences used to deny
dischargeability to certain debts where the debtor asserted the 5th Amendment to
questions regarding their dischargeability).
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2. Denial of Discharge
The court may deny a discharge182 if the debtor has refused in the case to
obey a lawful order of the court, to testify to self-incriminating matters after
being granted immunity, or to respond to a question approved by the court
without a proper assertion of the right against self-incrimination.183 If the debtor
refuses a court ordered inspection of documents, there is no violation of the Code
if the refusal is based on a proper assertion of the right against selfincrimination.184
A 2004 Exam is another instance in which a debtor may assert the privilege.
The bankruptcy court does not implicitly certify questions posed at a Rule 2004
examination.185 Thus, validly asserting a debtor’s Fifth Amendment rights,
without more, is not sufficient grounds to deny a discharge.186
3. Inability to Testify in Other Proceedings
Some consequences may affect the debtor’s ability to testify in subsequent
or contemporaneous (parallel) proceedings. For instance, if a debtor has refused
to testify in prior proceedings based on a proper assertion of her rights, then the
debtor may be barred from testifying in a later proceeding to any matters that
were raised or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.187 The debtor’s
inability to testify in a later proceeding complicates strategic planning for future
proceedings and makes assessment of the impact on anticipated proceedings
difficult, if not impossible.

182

11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)-(12) (2006). The chapter 7 discharge provision lists 12
grounds for objection to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) and (c) (2006) lists the
grounds for objection to discharge in chapter 13. The grounds for objection to
discharge in chapter 12 are listed in § 1228(a) and (c) (2006). The grounds for
objection to the discharge for an individual debtor in chapter 11 are listed at 11
U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2006).
183
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (2006).
184
See In re Bartel, Not Reported in B.R., 2009 WL 2461727 (Bankr. D. Mass.
Aug. 10, 2009).
185
See In re Merena, 413 B.R. 792, 819 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009).
186
See In re Ogden, 251 B.R. 441, 7 (Unpublished B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1999).
187
See e.g. In re Nat’l Audit Def. Network, 367 B.R. 207, 216-17 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 2007); United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 504-07
(W.D.N.Y. 1994); Clark & Gregory, Inc. v. Hanson (In re Hanson), 225 B.R. 366,
372 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986).
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4. Contempt of Court and imprisonment
Another consequence the debtor may face is contempt of court.188 A proper
invocation of the privilege in one hearing does not automatically carry the
privilege over to subsequent hearings.189 If the debtor asserts her privilege as to
certain questions in one hearing, but testifies to those facts in a later hearing, she
is not entitled to then re-assert her privilege as to those matters.190 If the debtor
disobeys a court order regarding those matters, supposing to rely on her
previously asserted privilege, the court may use its contempt power to impose
sanctions on the debtor, including fines and imprisonment.191
5. Dismissal of the Bankruptcy
Even if the debtor’s Fifth Amendment assertion of the privilege is properly
based, her case may be dismissed if her assertion hampers the trustee’s ability to
administer the bankruptcy estate.192 The court may dismiss the case with or
without prejudice. If the court dismisses the case without prejudice, the debtor
may file her petition after the threat of prosecution passes.193 Although this may
seem a reasonable solution, it is problematic for the debtor in that the protection
afforded against creditors’ claims is lost when the automatic stay is no longer in
place. In addition, there are negative implications for the debtor in attempting to
file another bankruptcy within the succeeding year.194

188

11 U.S.C. § 105; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020; And see note 185 infra.
See In re Weerawat, 2007 WL 710160 (Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 6, 2007).
190
Id.
191
Id.; See also Martin-Trigona v. Belford, 732 F.2d 170, 173-34 (2d Cir. 1984);
In re Sterling-Harris Ford, Inc., 315 F.2d 277, 278-279 (7th Cir. 1963).
192
See In re Blan, 239 B.R. 385, 397-98 (W.D. Ark. 1999); In re Moses, 792 F.
Supp. 529, 532-36, 38 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Fekos, 148 B.R. 10 (Bankr.
W.D. Penn. 1992); Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (stating that a court could dismiss a case sua sponte if it found that the trustee
was unable to administer the estate); In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 446-48 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1986).
193
See In re Pelko, 201 B.R. 331, 333 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996).
194
11 U.S.C. §362(c)(3) (2006). The refiling of a consumer bankruptcy case by
an individual after a dismissal within the preceding one year period of a pending
consumer case other than under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) results in the termination of the
stay with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case. The
court may extend the stay only after notice and a hearing. The debtor has the burden
of demonstrating that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to
be stayed. A case is presumed not to be in good faith, and the presumption must be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
189
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6. Implications in Criminal Proceedings
Invocation or waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination in
bankruptcy may have consequences in the criminal prosecution context as
well.195 Absent immunity, plaintiffs may invoke the Fifth Amendment in
response to incriminating questions during discovery or trial at any stage of the
criminal process.196 But, although a bankruptcy court may enforce a validly
issued protective order,197 a grand jury subpoena may take precedence over a
validly issued protective order.198 This leaves the debtor at risk during the
pendency of the bankruptcy even when the incriminating information appears to
be protected.
C. Waiver of the Privilege
A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right is not required in a
noncustodial setting.199 Thus, it is possible for a debtor to lose the benefit of the
privilege in the context of a bankruptcy without actual knowledge of the waiver
because the setting is viewed as noncustodial.200
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the privilege is waived if it is not
invoked.201 In other words, the privilege is not self-executing. Under certain
circumstances, the waiver may be inferred from a witness’ course of conduct or
prior statements concerning the subject of the case.202 The waiver is not to be

195
See e.g. In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (“That is one
of the misfortunes of bankruptcy if it follows crime. The right not to be compelled to
be a witness against oneself is not a right to appropriate property that may tell one’s
story.”)
196
Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11 (11th Cir.
1993).
197
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (c); Martindell v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1979).
198
United States v. Janet Greeson’s A Place For Us, Inc., (In re Grand Jury
Subpoena), 62 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1995).
199
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
200
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (holding that citizen is not in
custody if a reasonable person in his situation would have felt free to “terminate the
interrogation and leave”); Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1990); Compare 11 U.S.C. § 303, (the traditional rule that “a waiver will not be
lightly inferred,” still applies in involuntary cases) with In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670,
673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
201
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (The privilege against
self-incrimination is waived if it is not invoked) (citing United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931)).
202
Rivoli Grain Co. v. Litton (In re Litton), 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1987).
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lightly inferred, and the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
finding a testimonial waiver.203 However, the mere fact that a waiver may be
inferred creates a danger of inadvertent incrimination for the debtor. The
inference of a waiver is drawn if the statements have created a significant
likelihood that the finder of fact will be prone to rely on a distorted view of the
truth, and the debtor had reason to know that her prior statements would be
interpreted as a waiver.204
Filing bankruptcy schedules and statements may constitute a waiver of the
privilege.205 In an adversary proceeding, filing an answer and responding to
discovery requests may cause a waiver.206 Likewise, an affidavit operates like a
testimonial statement and may be interpreted as a waiver.207 On the other hand,
answering some questions prior to asserting the privilege will not necessarily
operate as a waiver as to all questions presented.208
Because there is no clear line of demarcation to signal the unintentional
waiver of the privilege by inference, the debtor is at risk to unwittingly allow
access to both disclosed and undisclosed information.209 This may occur based

203

In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (waiver is not to be
lightly inferred, and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a
testimonial waiver; waiver inferred if (1) the statements have created a significant
likelihood that the finder of fact will be left with and prone to rely on a distorted
view of the truth; and (2) the debtor had reason to know that her prior statements
would be interpreted as a waiver) (citing Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir.
1981)); but see Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(stating that a debtor is before the Bankruptcy Court voluntarily and is not entitled to
as much consideration in being compelled to testify as another witness would who
had no interest in the proceeding).
204
In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (waiver is not to be
lightly inferred, and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a
testimonial waiver; waiver inferred if (1) the statements have created a significant
likelihood that the finder of fact will be left with and prone to rely on a distorted
view of the truth; and (2) the debtor had reason to know that her prior statements
would be interpreted as a waiver) (citing Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir.
1981)); but see Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(stating that a debtor is before the Bankruptcy Court voluntarily and is not entitled to
as much consideration in being compelled to testify as another would who had no
interest in the proceeding).
205
Norbank v. Kroh (In re Kroh), 87 B.R. 1004, 1005 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
206
Id. at 1005.
207
Edmond v. Consumer Protection Div. (In re Edmond), 934 F.2d 1304, 130708 (4th Cir. 1991).
208
In re Jacques, 115 B.R. 272, 273 (D. Nevada 1990).
209
Charter Fed. Sav. Ass'n v. Rezak (In re Lederman), 140 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“With regard to the requested items which may not have been
previously disclosed, or to the extent that such commitment may not be legally
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on a witness’ course of conduct or prior statements concerning the case and
without an inquiry into whether or not the witness was aware of the privilege and
chose to waive it consciously.210
1. Depositions and 2004 examinations
The bankruptcy debtor is more at risk to unknowingly waive the privilege
than the person in a custodial setting. The debtor may be deemed to have waived
the privilege for purposes of a 2004 examination based on the debtor’s having
testified at an earlier deposition on incriminating matters despite the fact that her
attorney did not advise her of the privilege or instruct her not to answer in the
earlier deposition, and even though she was not aware at the time that the
statements might be incriminating.211 In similar fashion, the debtor may have
waived the privilege in bankruptcy proceedings by voluntarily answering
questions and follow-up questions in earlier depositions regarding the same
subject matter, despite the fact that counsel was not present at the depositions
and the debtor was not informed of the privilege.212 In contrast, the failure to
raise the privilege as an objection to subpoenaed documents has been held not to
constitute a waiver.213 Consequently, the likelihood of inadvertent waiver of the
privilege by the debtor can be seen to increase dramatically depending on the
circumstances.
The debtor’s ability to waive the privilege inadvertently due to lack of
knowledge of its existence places the uninformed debtor at a serious
disadvantage when compared to her more informed counterpart. The debtor’s
loss of the privilege through the inadvertence or neglect of counsel highlights the
critical importance of educating the individual debtor and counsel about the
privilege. Without disclosure to the debtor of the existence of the privilege, the
probability of inadvertent waiver and any ensuing negative consequences falls
disproportionately on the poor, the learning disabled, the uneducated, and the
debtor represented by ineffective counsel.214 In other words, those in our society

binding, the privilege has been lost or waived for failure to have raised it timely. As
the Supreme Court held: ‘a witness loses the privilege by failing to claim it properly
even though the information being sought remains undisclosed when the privilege is
claimed.’”) (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976)).
210
Horowitz v. Sheldon (In re Donald Sheldon & Co.), 193 B.R. 152, 162
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)).
211
See supra note 9.
212
In re Cotillion Invs., Inc., 343 B.R. 344, 351-2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
213
DG Creditor Corp. v. Dabah (In re DG Acquisition Corp.), 151 F.3d 75 (2d
Cir. 1998).
214 One author characterizes the caselaw pertaining to learning disabled
adults as follows:
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who are least able to recover from the inadvertent waiver are the most likely to
suffer the consequences. Aside from issues of due process and equal protection
under the law, lack of notice of the waiver goes to the central issue of
fundamental fairness that relates to the projected image and the perceived image
of our system of justice as unbiased, impartial, and evenhanded.
Because legal entities are not considered persons for purposes of invoking
the privilege, an individual’s ability to claim the privilege may be affected by her
prior testimony, actions and events regarding a legal entity. For instance, the
debtor corporation’s principal may not invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege to
avoid answering questions at a 2004 examination215 when she has previously
pled guilty in a criminal court on the issues.216 On the other hand, if the debtor’s
principal answers, “I don’t know” or “I don’t recall” to almost every question in
an earlier deposition, the privilege may be preserved and claimed in a subsequent
deposition despite the fact that it was not formally invoked on the earlier
deposition.217
2. Schedules
The law is well settled that if the debtor fails to invoke the privilege at the
time she files her schedules, it is waived as to the facts shown, and the
information will be admissible evidence against her in a criminal prosecution.218
Because the debtor’s schedules are required and must be filed with the petition,
any potential for incrimination should be explained to the debtor prior to the
filing. Otherwise, the debtor may inadvertently waive the privilege, be
incriminated irreversibly, face criminal prosecution based on her own supplied
evidence, and suffer a denial of her discharge. As stated above, the fact that the

Colorado v. Connelly held that although the defendant was mentally ill, his
waiver was voluntary, thus valid. The majority reasoned that the sole
concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is
governmental coercion. . . . The Court stated that under a due process
analysis, beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, all cases deciding the
constitutionality of a confession have contained a substantial element of
police coercion. The Connelly Court stated that it is not the role of the
Court to make “sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal
defendant who has confessed” unless there is evidence of police coercion.
STEVEN A. GREENBURG, Learning Disabled Juveniles & Miranda Rights -- What
Constitutes Voluntary, Knowing, & Intelligent Waiver, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
487, 494-95 (1991).
215
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 (The court may order the examination of any entity.)
216
In re Cassandra Group, 338 B.R. 600, 604 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
217
Horowitz v. Sheldon (In re Donald Sheldon & Co.), 193 B.R. 152 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
218
Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913); Czarlinsky v. United States, 54
F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 549 (1932).
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debtor has not been properly advised by counsel or does not understand the
privilege will not serve to avoid the waiver or minimize any damage resulting
from the admissibility of the evidence.219
3. The 341 Meeting
The Court in addressing the issue of waiver in the context of the first
meeting of creditors has spoken plainly. If the debtor voluntarily testifies at the
341 meeting without invoking the privilege, she may waive the privilege for later
proceedings as to all matters related to the scope of her testimony,220 whether or
not her waiver was knowing and intelligent.221 As noted above, the waiver is
inferred when the statements create a significant likelihood that the judge or jury
will be likely to rely on a distorted view of the truth, and the debtor has reason to
know that her prior statements will be interpreted as a waiver.222 Equally
problematic is that a blanket invocation of the privilege is not a “proper
assertion” and thus will not suffice to protect the debtor.223
D. The Dangers of Parallel Proceedings
A debtor faces a particular risk if she is exposed to parallel proceedings.
Parallel proceedings are any simultaneous proceedings that are based on the
same facts that serve as a basis for all of the claims.224 This situation arises

219

See supra note 9.
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 428 (1983) (if the debtor voluntarily
testifies at the 341 meeting without invoking the privilege, she may waive the
privilege for later proceedings as to all matters related to the scope of her testimony).
221
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1976) (knowing and
intelligent waiver is not required in a noncustodial setting; “an individual may lose
the benefit of the privilege [against self-incrimination] without making a knowing
and intelligent waiver.”).
222
In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673-75 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (waiver inferred if
(1) the statements have created a significant likelihood that the finder of fact will be
left with and prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth; and (2) the debtor had
reason to know that her prior statements would be interpreted as a waiver).
223
In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that a
blanket assertion of the privilege is not proper where debtor refused to answer 341
questions and had not scheduled creditors, debts, or assets, and liabilities, and where
debtor provided no evidence of potential criminal investigation. The requisites for
asserting the privilege are 1) a compelled disclosure; 2) found to be testimonial; and
3) incriminatory). See also In re Brandenberg, 2007 WL 117391 (blanket invocation
not sufficient).
224
See 17 CFR 12.24 (defining parallel proceedings in the context of commodity
and security exchanges as “[a] civil court proceeding, involving one or more of the
respondents as a party, which is pending at the time the [other] complaint is filed and
220
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when the debtor is involved in a bankruptcy and a criminal proceeding at the
same time. As explained below, the risk remains even when the debtor claims
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in both proceedings.225
Imagine a scenario in which a debtor in bankruptcy is also the subject of a
criminal proceeding. If the debtor were involved only in the criminal
proceeding, the prosecuting authority would be limited in its discovery of
information.226 However, the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to a wider berth
during discovery in bankruptcy because of the mandate that the debtor file
schedules and answer certain questions under oath.227 Therefore, the prosecuting
authority could have access to information via the civil proceeding that it can use
in the criminal proceeding.228
Under some circumstances, if the debtor’s availability for examination by
the trustee is in doubt, the debtor may be arrested by law enforcement officials,

involves claims or counterclaims that are based on the same set of facts which serve
as a basis for all of the claims in the reparations complaint”); CHRISTIAN BABICH,
COMMENT: Parallel Proceedings: The Government’s Double-Team Approach and
the Degradation of Constitutional Protections, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 753, 754
(2007); CARL H. LOEWENSON, JR., Morrison & Foerester LLP, Parallel Proceedings,
at 1,
http://www.mofo.com/files/Publication/b72e0c65-297f-455f-a9bb6e0b63eb28c2/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/bd3bc6f0-6563-4f4b-a3f20c18189b5d98/04PLIDO.pdf (last visited 2/3/13) (defining parallel proceedings as
“two or more investigations or actions, concerning allegations arising from the same
(or substantially the same) set of facts, proceed simultaneously or successively
against the same or related parties.”).
225
See infra note 225. See Walter P. Loughlin, Fighting on Two Fronts: Parallel
Proceedings and Challenges at the Intersection of Criminal and Civil Law, The
Metropolitan
Corporate
Counsel,
32
(Oct.
2006)
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/October/32.pdf (last visited 2/3/13)
(outlining restrictions that courts have put on the government in parallel
proceedings).
226
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Middleton v. U.S., 401 A.2D 109, 115 (D.C. 1979)
(emphasizing limits on discovery rights to the government in criminal cases based on
18 U.S.C. § 3500). See infra Part III(D)(2).
227
11 U.S.C. § 521 (providing that the debtor shall perform certain duties
including, but not limited to, filing a list of creditors, a schedule of assets and
liabilities, a schedule of income and expenses, a statement of financial affairs, and a
statement of intentions regarding secured property; further duties include furnishing
the trustee copies of payroll records, a Federal tax return for the most recent tax year,
and photo identification).
228
One possible procedural remedy is for the bankruptcy court to stay the
proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings so that the debtor can
then proceed with confidence having finally resolved the related issues. See infra
note 189.
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held in custody until a detention hearing, and released only upon certain
conditions.229 If the debtor’s attorney is not sensitive to these issues, the debtor
may be exposed to the unnecessary risk of criminal liability.230 Although courts
have reacted negatively to the government’s invocation of both civil and
criminal processes in parallel proceedings, such conduct is not prohibited, and
still presents a risk of inadvertent disclosure to a debtor.231
1. Protective Orders and Grand Jury Subpoenas
The problematic nature of parallel proceedings can be seen in the procedural
interplay between competing parties and the courts in separate civil and criminal
actions. One example is when a grand jury subpoena duces tecum conflicts with
a protective order.232 The Courts of Appeal have sometimes reached different
results in similar situations.233
In one instance, a protective order enforced by the bankruptcy court to
quash a subpoena duces tecum from the United States Attorney was deemed a

FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) – (g) (2006).
68% of the 1,245,205 licensed attorneys in the U.S. are in private practice.
(American Bar Association, Lawyer Demographics, available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer
_demographics_2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf ) (last visited 1/30/13)The
Martindale-Hubbell database lists 39,126 bankruptcy attorneys in the United States.
Only 4,756 attorneys are listed as practicing both bankruptcy and criminal law.
(http://www.martindale.com/Results.aspx?ft=1&frm=freesearch&afs= Bankruptcy
(last visited 1/30/13).) Arguably, those 4,756 attorneys are better prepared to raise
the Fifth Amendment in bankruptcy because their practice would encounter it on a
more regular basis.
231
See Walter P. Loughlin, Fighting on Two Fronts: Parallel Proceedings and
Challenges at the Intersection of Criminal and Civil Law, The Metropolitan
Corporate Counsel, p.32 (Oct. 2006) http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/
October/32.pdf (last visited 2/3/13) (outlining restrictions that courts have put on the
government in parallel proceedings).
232
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
233
Compare Martindell v. ITT, 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979) (absent a
showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some
extraordinary circumstance or compelling need a witness should be entitled to rely
upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties), with In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988) (valid protective order
was not sufficient grounds to quash the subpoena duces tecum), Grand Jury
Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1020 (11th Cir. 1993) (Rule
26(c) protective order does not shield relevant information from a later grand jury
investigation), and In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Meserve, Mumper &
Hughes, 62 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting a per se rule that grand jury
subpoenas take precedence over validly issued Rule 26(c) protective orders).
229
230
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“de facto grant of immunity.” 234 This result obtained despite the fact that the
court acknowledged that the power to grant immunity is reserved to the
Executive Branch.235 In one case, the court gave precedence to a grand jury
subpoena over a validly issued protective order of discovery, and the debtor was
ordered to produce incriminating documents.236
In yet another case, the court held that absent a showing of improvidence in
the grant of a protective order, exceptional circumstance, or compelling need, a
witness is entitled to rely on the enforceability of a protective order against any
third parties, including the government.237 The court held that a protective order
should not be vacated or modified merely to accommodate the state’s desire to
inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal investigation, either as
evidence or as the subject of a possible perjury charge.238
Even when the protective order is given precedence over the grand jury
subpoena, the trier of fact may be permitted to use the silence of the witness for
the relevant inference it creates.239 However, the Court has held that the witness
may not be compelled against a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
to repeat prior ‘immunized testimony” verbatim without a contemporaneous
assurance of immunity.240 The Court’s holding also extended to the compulsion
of closely tracking testimony by the witness as it relates to prior “immunized
testimony.”241
2. Differences in Civil and Criminal Discovery
Neither party is obliged to reveal much information during the discovery
process in criminal proceedings. Under the Federal Rules, a defendant in a
criminal proceeding is entitled to receive only his own statements, his prior
criminal record, items that are “material to preparing the defense,” items the
government plans to use in its case-in-chief, and items belonging to or obtained

234

In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Under Seal), 836 F.2d 1468, 1475 (4th Cir.
1988) (protective order, when enforced by the bankruptcy court to quash a subpoena
duces tecum from the U.S. Attorney works as a “de facto grant of immunity,”
however, 6003(a) states that the power to choose who may receive immunity is
exclusively within the Executive Branch.).
235
Id at 1017.
236
United States v. Janet Greeson’s a Place for Us (In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Served on Meserve), 62 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1995).
237
Martindell v. ITT, 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979); See also In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (Roach), 138 F.3d 442, 445 (1st Cir. 1998).
238
Id at 296.
239
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
240
Pilsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
241
Id at 261.
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from the defendant by the government.242 Additionally, the defendant is only
required to disclose evidence for her case-in-chief, and only where the defendant
made a reciprocal request.243
However, in a civil action, both parties are entitled to discover much more
information. In civil actions, both parties are entitled to all relevant, nonprivileged material “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”244 Thus, the scope of discovery in civil actions is often limited only
by the zeal of the litigants. The evidentiary standard while perhaps excluding
“witch hunts” may often fairly be characterized as a “fishing expedition.”245
Litigants are not required to prove that a line of inquiry will lead to
admissible evidence.246 Instead, they are merely required to make a reasonable
argument that the information could.247 In other words, access to information in
the civil setting hinges on whether, in the estimation of the court, a litigant’s
particular inquiry may arguably capture information that points towards
admissible evidence. While this discovery rule leaves some information off
limits, it rightfully encourages the parties’ search for the truth by providing a
standard that is flexible, fluid and somewhat unpredictable.248
3. Discovery in Bankruptcy and the Risk of Loss of the Privilege
Bankruptcy has discovery provisions that are similar to other civil
proceedings, but distinctive in many ways. Each form of discovery creates an
opportunity for loss of the privilege. Unlike other civil proceedings, the Code
requires the debtor to appear at a meeting convened by the United States
Bankruptcy trustee for oral examination under oath.249 This meeting is similar
to a public deposition and is referred to as the meeting of creditors or 341
meeting. The debtor in each case is subject to interrogation by any appearing
creditor, the panel trustee, any examiner in the case, and the United States
trustee.250

242

FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1); See Loewenson, supra note 218, at 24.
Id. But see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (state has an obligation to
furnish exculpatory evidence in their possession).
244
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(1); See Loewenson, supra note 218, at 24-25.
245
Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
246
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, (1978) (emphasis
added).
247
Id.
248
Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U. A.,
657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981).
249
11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). See supra Part III, c. 3, The 341 Meeting
250
11 U.S.C. § 343.
243
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The scope of the examination is limited to “the acts, conduct, property,
liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, and any other matter that may
affect the administration of the debtor’s estate or to the debtor’s right to a
discharge.”251 The Code description of the examination’s scope appears
restrictive by use of the phrase “The examination…may relate only to…” yet
when the provision is read in its entirety, the breadth of the permitted inquiry is
notably sweeping and detailed. 252 Refusal or inability of the debtor to attend the
341 meeting, furnish information required by the Code, or cooperate with the
trustee may result in dismissal of the bankruptcy, conversion, or denial of the
discharge.253
In addition to the requirement that the debtor attend, submit to interrogation
and testify at the 341 meeting, the court may order the examination of the debtor
on the motion of any party in interest.254 Such examinations are often referred to
as 2004 examinations and the breadth of the scope of inquiry is the same as for
the 341 meeting. 255 The attendance of the debtor at the examination may be
compelled in the same manner as a witness at a trial in United States District
Court.256 The court may designate that the debtor be examined at any time and
place.257
4. The Debtor’s Failure to Appear, Incarceration, and the Need for
Notice of the Privilege
The debtor may be held in custody and treated as a criminal in some
instances even though no criminal charges have been made. If the debtor is
deemed necessary for the proper administration of the estate and is alleged by

251

FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(b).
Id.
253
11 U.S.C. § 707 (a)(1) (providing that the court may dismiss a case under
chapter 7 for cause including unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to
creditors). See § 707 HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES (clarifying that the causes
listed are illustrative and not exhaustive). See also 11 U.S.C. § 521 (i)(4),(j)(1)
(providing that the court may decline to dismiss the case if the debtor tried in good
faith to file the required information and that the best interests of the creditors would
be served by administration of the estate; or if the debtor failed to file a tax return
that becomes due after commencement of the case, the court shall convert or dismiss
the case whichever is in the best interests of the creditors add the estate). And see
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4002.
254
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a) (emphasis added).
255
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(b). See supra Part III, C, 1. Waiver of the Privilege –
Depositions and 2004 Examinations
256
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9016 (incorporating by
reference FED.R. CIV. P. 45 and thus providing for the form, issuance and service of
subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecum for trials, hearings and depositions).
257
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(d).
252
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affidavit to be avoiding examination, the court may order law enforcement to
bring the debtor to court without delay.258 The grounds for such an order include
a sworn allegation that there is “reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is
about to leave or has left her residence or her business; has evaded process that
directs attendance at an examination; or has willfully disobeyed a subpoena or
order to appear for examination.” 259 Whenever the debtor is found in a judicial
district other than that from which the order was issued, the debtor may be taken
into custody and removed either to the court issuing the order or the nearest
available United States magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, or district judge. 260
If the judge finds that the person in custody is the debtor, the debtor is
released on conditions to insure her prompt appearance before the court that
issued the order to compel attendance. 261 In deciding conditions to assure the
debtor’s attendance for examination, obedience for further examination, and
appearance for purposes of removal from another jurisdiction, the court is
governed by the provisions and policies of the federal criminal code.262 The
applicable section with regard to release or detention pending trial provides a
number of factors that the court must consider with an eye towards the
imposition of the least restrictive means of securing the attendance of the
debtor.263 In this circumstance, the debtor may be taken into custody, held until
the detention hearing and in all respects dealt with as a criminal defendant
pending her rebuttal of the allegations based on an affidavit. 264 In this situation,
the debtor is clearly in a custodial setting, albeit in a bankruptcy proceeding, and
the debtor should be provided notice of her privilege against selfincrimination.265 Yet, despite the obvious need for notice, there is no provision
that requires such notice be given.
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FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(a).
Id.
260
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(b).
261
Id.
262
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)-(b) (defining the offense
of failure to appear and providing for punishment for failure to appear in criminal
proceedings).
263
18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)-(g) (setting forth the court’s procedure in detention
hearings in criminal proceedings and the factors to be considered).
264
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)-(g) (setting forth the
court’s procedure in detention hearings in criminal proceedings and the factors to be
considered).
265
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (an individual under custodial
interrogation is entitled to warning (notice) of her right to remain silent or end
questioning; right to attorney); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004)
(holding that citizen is not in custody if a reasonable person in his situation would
have felt free to “terminate the interrogation and leave”).
259
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E. The Compulsion of Testimony
As noted above,266 immunity is a term of art in the law with many nuanced
meanings depending on context.267 The types of immunity that are relevant for
the purposes of this article are transactional immunity, use immunity and
derivative use immunity. Transactional immunity is a grant of immunity that
shields the witness from any exposure to criminal liability that is related to a
particular transaction.268 Use immunity is more limited than transactional
immunity. The witness is protected only from the “use” of the witness’
testimony in any criminal proceeding against the witness. The value of the
privilege is reduced when use immunity, rather than transactional immunity, is
used to supplant the debtor’s privilege because of the degree to which protection
from criminal prosecution is lost.269 Derivative use immunity is closely related
to use immunity. The use of evidence that is derived from the witness’
testimony, “fruits” of the immunized testimony, is denied to the state when the
debtor is given derivative use immunity.270
The law has changed over time as it relates to the type of immunity that
suffices to justify the compulsion of testimony in the face of the proper assertion
of the privilege.271 Under prior law, the debtor was allowed to refuse to answer
incriminating questions even though the Bankruptcy Act (the Act) provided
automatic limited272 use immunity.273 The Act is the immediate predecessor to

266

See supra Part I E.
Congressional immunity, sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity, and
judicial immunity are beyond the scope of this article. Though each could touch the
realm of bankruptcy practice, none lie at the heart of the author’s thesis.
268
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586, (1892).
269
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 466-67, (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
270
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, (1964).
(“[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled to
give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled
testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in
connection with a criminal prosecution against him.”)
271
Counselman, 142 U.S. at 547 (required transactional immunity). Kastigar,
406 U.S. at 441 (1972) (overruled Counselman on that point and substituted use and
derivative use immunity as a sufficient basis to compel testimony as against an
assertion of the privilege).
272
The immunity was limited in two ways. The protection afforded was
restricted to the debtor’s testimony, not documents, and even the testimony could be
used in hearings on objections to discharge. United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974,
981 (5th Cir. 1974). (“Nor does that immunity extend, as the appellant would have
it, to certain of his books and records introduced in evidence against him at trial.”);
Former 11 U.S.C. 25(a)(10) “[N]o testimony, or any evidence which is directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony, given by him shall be offered in evidence
267
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the modern-day Code and required that the debtor testify in all circumstances.274
The debtor’s refusal to answer any material question could result in the denial of
the debtor’s discharge.275 The debtor was expected to be forthcoming even on
incriminating matters because the Act granted use immunity automatically
without the necessity of the debtor’s invocation of the privilege.276
Thus, the Court has altered the type of immunity necessary to compel
testimony in the face of a proper assertion of the privilege. The Court has moved
from a rule, mandating transactional immunity in exchange for “immunized
testimony”,277 to a rule permitting the compulsion of privileged testimony
through use immunity and derivative use immunity.278 Debtors, debtors’
counsel, and the courts have been affected in dramatically different ways by the
Court’s decisions and the exceptions to the exercise of the privilege that allow
compulsion of incriminating documents after assertion of the privilege without a
grant of immunity.279

against him in any criminal proceeding, except such testimony as may be given by
him in the hearing upon objections to his discharge”
273
In re Rosser, 96 F. 305 (E.D. Mo. 1899) (debtor refused to answer certain
questions before a referee on the ground of self-incrimination, and refusal allowed
despite the fact that § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act gave use immunity to the debtor).
274
Former 11 USC § 25(a)(10) (debtor required to testify in all circumstances).
275
Former 11 USC § 32(c)(6) (refusal to answer material question was grounds
for a denial of a discharge).
276
Former 11 USC § 25(a)(10) (statutory grant of use immunity).
277
Counselman, 142 U.S. at 585-86 (1892) (reasoning that no statute that leaves
the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the incriminating
question can supplant the privilege and holding that to be valid a statute was to
afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the
question relates).
278
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462 (1972) (immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony over
claim of privilege; in any subsequent criminal prosecution, the prosecution has the
burden of proving affirmatively that evidence proposed is derived from a legitimate
source wholly independent of compelled testimony).
279
Compulsion of the production of incriminating documents has been allowed
after proper assertion of the privilege and without a grant of immunity thus creating
exceptions to the exercise of the privilege under various theories including a
corporate records exception, public records exception, a required records exception
and an exception based on the assumption of custodial duties under a required
regulatory regime. See respectively, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380
(1911) (if corporate papers are records of an organization or “collective entity” with
a duty to keep records, no Fifth Amendment privilege attached); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 119 B.R. 945, 949-50 n. 4 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (documents that Chapter
7 trustee had to maintain in his official capacity as trustee of bankruptcy estate
qualified as “public records,” which trustee could be required to produce under
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1. Procedure for the Grant of Immunity
Under Part V of title 18,280 whenever a witness refuses to testify in a court
proceeding based on her privilege against self-incrimination, an Assistant United
States Attorney must first seek the U.S. Attorney’s permission to refer the matter
to an Assistant Attorney General (AAG), and then must obtain the approval of
the AAG for the Criminal Division or the AAG for the division of the
Department of Justice accountable for the case.281 If an AAG other than the
AAG for the Criminal Division approves the request, the approval of the AAG
for the Criminal Division is also necessary.282 The Assistant U.S. Attorney may
then file the necessary motion in the District Court requesting an order granting
the debtor immunity related to that testimony.283
If use and derivative use immunity are granted, the debtor may not lawfully
refuse to testify to those issues.284 However, no testimony or other information
compelled under the order, or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or information may be used against the debtor in any criminal
case, except for prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.285 The protection that the grant of use and
derivative use immunity affords the debtor from exposure to criminal liability is
beneficial but problematic.

public records exception to Fifth Amendment; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Served Upon Underhill, 781 F.2d 64, 67(6th Cir. 1986); Balt. City Dept. of
Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) (a person may not claim the
Amendment's protections based upon the incrimination that may result from the
“unadorned act of producing the child” or the “contents or nature of the thing
demanded”).
280
18 U.S.C. § 6001 et. Seq. (2006).
281
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 9-23.110 to -310 (1992). As
an alternative, informal or “hip pocket” immunity may be granted. The debtor
should still be cautious of this form of immunity as it arises from no statutory
provision, is discretionary with the prosecutor, and is not binding on any other
jurisdiction. Courts have frowned upon the practice, but have accepted it as the
promise not to prosecute is of value. United States v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 602, 606
(10th Cir. 1985) (“The propriety of using informal immunity has been frequently
upheld. United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976); see also United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d
658, 662–63 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).”)
282
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 9-23.130 (1992).
283
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (2006); and see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S.
Attorney’s Manual § 9-23.310 (1992).
284
18 U.S.C. § 6002.
285
Id.
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As noted above, use and derivative use immunity combined do not provide
the debtor the same level of protection as transactional immunity and leave her
open to criminal sanctions based on evidence unrelated to the debtor’s testimony.
In addition, the grant of immunity does not prevent the use of the debtor’s
testimony to prove elements of a crime in the bankruptcy proceeding as a basis
for denial of discharge.286 In short, the grant of use and derivative use immunity
in the context of the bankruptcy proceedings may lessen the possibility that
criminal charges may be brought and proven, but it does not fully protect the
debtor from criminal punishment, civil liability, and a denial of discharge.
Considering the disadvantages the debtor faces if she testifies after the court
issues a grant of immunity, the debtor might be tempted to refuse to testify
despite a grant of immunity. That also is problematic. The debtor’s refusal to
testify after a grant of use and derivative use immunity is grounds for a global
objection to discharge and a basis for the court’s denial of discharge.287 In
addition, the debtor’s refusal to testify after a grant of immunity may subject her
to contempt proceedings and sanctions including fines and imprisonment.288 In
other words, whether the debtor testifies after a grant of use and derivative use
immunity, or whether the debtor refuses to testify after a grant of use immunity,
the debtor risks going to jail and a denial of discharge.289 What may seem a
Hobson’s choice290 is, for the truly innocent debtor, more akin to Sophie’s
choice,291 and has been explored by commentators but largely ignored or
accepted by Congress and the courts.292

286

In re Leslie, 119 F. 406,409 (N.D.N.Y. 1903).
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6).
288
In re Martin-Trigona, 732 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1984).
289
Analogously, in Garrity v. State of N.J., when the choice was imposed on
police officers accused of conspiracy to obstruct justice to choose between selfincrimination and job forfeiture, the Court held that such coercion violated the
privilege against self-incrimination. 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967).
290
A Hobson’s choice is a free choice with only one option offered.
291
The term Sophie’s choice, after the novel and film of the same name, refers
to a choice between two unbearable options. Sophie’s Choice was undeniably more
horrific than the scenario posed here for Sophie Debtor.
292
Craig Peyton Gaumer and Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth of Consequences: The
Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 559-560 (1997); Bankruptcy Courts
and the Reluctant Witness: Why A Rule 26(c) Protective Order Is Not A Substitute
for A Grant of Immunity When the Witness Refuses to Testify Based Upon Fear of
Criminal Prosecution, 25 CAL. BANKR. J. 180, 182 (2000); Allan B. Diamond and
Erin E. Jones, Avoiding Litigation Pitfalls: An Introduction to the Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy Proceedings, Am. Bankr. Inst. J.,
20, 66 (2008); Leonard M. Shulman and Kara Germane, A Debtor's Right to Silence
in A Bankruptcy Proceeding, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., 46, 47 (2005).
287
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If the United States Attorney does not request immunity for the debtor, or if
immunity is not offered, then the debtor may refuse to testify, invoking her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and retain her right to a
discharge.293 A debtor may invoke her right in response to incriminating
questions both during discovery and at trial.294 As noted earlier, current
bankruptcy law under the Code specifically provides for the preservation of the
privilege, though unlike its predecessor Act, the grant of immunity is not
automatic.295
2. Practical considerations
The statistical probability of an offer of immunity is small.296 It is unlikely
that a request for immunity by the trustee or the United States Attorney will be
made, and any request may be denied by the Assistant U.S. Attorney or the
district court. Often there is a sense that a successful objection to discharge can
be accomplished without the testimonial information that a grant of immunity
would compel. Likewise, a United States Attorney may prefer to prosecute with
the available evidence rather than suffer the proof burden of establishing that the
state’s case is not comprised of the debtor’s testimony or any fruits (evidence)
derived from that testimony.
IV. THE FORM OF REFORM TO PROTECT THE PRIVILEGE
A. Revision of Official Form B201A Notice to Individual Debtors
The pro se debtor and the debtor with counsel need notice of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. All debtors should be advised
of the existence of the privilege and should be given some sense of its scope and
its limitations. Pre-filing disclosures relevant to invocation and waiver and the
potential consequences of each would serve the purposes of the rules of
bankruptcy procedure and promote the ends of justice.297 Some may seize on

293

In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Girdaukas,
92B.R. 373, 376 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988); In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 426 & 430
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Salzman (In re Salzman), 61 B.R.
878, 889 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Turner v. Wlodarski (In re Minton Group, Inc.),
43 B.R. 705, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
294
Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11 (11th Cir.
1993).
295
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
296
This assertion is based on the author’s observations as a deputy prosecuting
attorney, bankruptcy trustee, judge, and practitioner for over 36 years and
conversations with trustees and government attorneys.
297
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
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this proposal as a Miranda warning for the debtor and argue it exceeds the
mandate of Miranda because the proceedings are not custodial or criminal. Aside
from the fact that the proceedings may be custodial,298 the author’s thesis is not
that Miranda should apply even in a noncustodial setting. The author’s thesis is
that the privilege exists as a constitutional right in bankruptcy, and that it has
value and utility to debtors. Therefore, as a matter of adjudicative policy, the
Court in its inherent power should preserve the liberties of persons entitled to the
privilege through disclosure of the right.
To accomplish this result a new proposal for an Official Form should be
promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to its
authority under FRBP 9009. In the interim, the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts should issue additional forms for use under
the Code pursuant to FRBP 9009.299 The proposed form should be construed to
be consistent with the rules and the Code and secure the “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding.”300
1. The Status Quo
Current law mandates that the Official Forms offer several notices and
warnings to the consumer debtor. The first notice is regarding the opportunities
for credit counseling, budget analysis, and instruction on financial
management.301 The second notice advises the consumer debtor of the four
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code that may be available as filing options and
briefly outlines the nature of each chapter.302 In the third numbered paragraph of
the Official Form, the debtor is warned that the criminal penalties for the
fraudulent concealment of assets, perjury and false swearing include fines,
imprisonment, or both.303
This notice regarding criminal conduct and penalties is immediately
followed by the disclosure that “All information supplied by a debtor…is subject
to examination by…the Department of Justice.”304 Finally, in a section labeled
“WARNING” Official Form B201A concludes by disclosing that Section
521(a)(1) of the Code requires the debtor to promptly file detailed information

298

See supra Part III.D.4
Information on the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is
online at http://www.uscourts.gov/ FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/
BankruptcyCourts.aspx. The current Director is Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Judge
Hogan is the chief administrative officer for the federal courts and secretary to the
Judicial Conference of the United States.
300
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
301
11 U.S.C. § 342(b), FEDERAL R. BANKR. P. 9009. See Official Form B201A.
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id.
299

2013]

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY

51

regarding creditors, assets, liabilities, income, expenses and her general financial
condition. This paragraph warns the debtor that her bankruptcy case may be
dismissed if this information is not filed with the court within the time deadlines
set by the Code, Rules and local rules. The debtor is directed to a website
address for Official Form B200 which provides a listing of the documents and
deadlines.305
The debtor’s attorney must certify delivery of the required notices and the
debtor must affirm that she has received and read the notices.306 The
requirement of these and other notices to the debtor by Congress and the Court,
make clear the importance current law places on the disclosure to the debtor of
the opportunities to avoid bankruptcy, potential bankruptcy filing options, the
possibilities for criminal exposure, criminal penalties, the availability of
documents for inspection by the DOJ, the requirements for disclosure, and risk
of dismissal.307 It seems illogical that given the present breadth and depth in the
level of specificity of notices to the debtor, that the Code, Rules and Official
Forms should be strangely silent regarding the debtor’s privilege against selfincrimination. This is particularly true in the light of the evidentiary value of the
privilege and its relative importance when compared to the notices pertaining to
statutory rights and criminal penalties.
2. A Modest Proposal for Change
As a policy matter, the notion that each of these mandated notices and
warnings are more critical to the consumer debtor than the disclosure of the
privilege is untenable. Although disclosure of the existence of the privilege is
not required under current law, there is no prohibition of notice. When
consideration is given to the constitutional origins and evidentiary value of the
privilege, particularly to the pro se debtor, the absence of notice is alarming and
difficult to understand.308 Although traditionally in bankruptcy, pro se litigants
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Id.
11 U.S.C. § 342(b), FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009. See Official Form B201B.
307
Id. And See Official Form B201A.
308
Studies show the demographics for pro se debtors in state courts to include a
higher incidence among the young, the poor, the less educated, women and
minorities. Ayn Crawley, Trends in Pro Se Litigation, Maryland Legal Assistance
Network. (Statewide statistics of over 40,000 self-represented users of programs in
Maryland in 2002 show: 60% were women; 44% described themselves as African
American and 9% as Hispanic; the vast majority had modest incomes.)
http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/memos/prosestatsmemo.htm#other (last
visited 2/3/13). For other studies that show a disproportionate number of women and
minorities, see Beck, Connie J.A.., et al., Divorce Mediation With and Without
Legal Representation: A Focus on Intimate Partner Violence and Abuse, Family
Court Review, 48(4): 631-645, October 2010. http://courtadr.org/library/
306
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are assumed to be less educated than debtors who are represented, the opposite is
true. The pro se debtor is also more educated than the general pro se
population.309 The higher level of education, coupled with the publication and
availability of the official forms, engenders a hubris in the consumer debtor. The
resulting overconfidence when combined with the easy availability of the forms
tempts the pro se debtor to file a complex federal proceeding that is beyond the
debtor's expertise.310 As a consequence, the pro se debtor often discovers
belatedly that the filing was ill advised and will be dismissed or have unintended
results. The proof of this phenomenon can be seen in the relative success
rates between pro se and represented filers in obtaining a discharge.311 Pro se
filers are ten times less likely to obtain a discharge.312
A procedure for disclosure of the right to the privilege currently exists,
albeit in the context of another federal civil proceeding. 313 For more than two
decades, the federal administrative rules have been used to mandate that notice
of the privilege be given by the Department of Justice to respondents in
proceedings to assess civil penalties for possession of small amounts of certain
controlled substances.314 Thus, there is a precedent, a form, and a format in use
by federal authorities in civil proceedings that provide a template for the
construction of a similar notice in the bankruptcy context.315 The adoption of the

view.php?ID=5797 (last visited 2/3/13). And see Chanley S. Painter, 2011 Capstone
Project, Exploring the Problem of Self-Represented Litigants in Arkansas Civil
Courts, Arkansas Access to Justice Commission in partnership with the Clinton
School of Public Service. http://www.arkansasjustice.org/sites/default/files/
Capstone%20Report%20-%20AAJC%20Final.pdf (last visited 2/3/13).
309
ANGELA LITTWIN, BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 157158 (Stanford University Press) Katherine Porter, editor (2012) Results basaed on
the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project. For possible explanations of this
phenomenon, see Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than
Other Debtor Relief, Litigation News, December 29, 2011, available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-sebankruptcy-growing.html
(last visited 2/3/13).
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 76.4 (b)(2) (2007) (stating that the
Notice of Intent to Assess a Civil Penalty will advise the respondent that any
statement given may be used against the person in any proceeding, including
criminal prosecution and that the respondent may be able to assert a privilege such as
the privilege against self-incrimination.)
314
Id.
315
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006); 28 C.F.R. 76.9 (c)(2)-(3) (2007) (providing that
the content of any answer filed by a respondent may contain a statement that an
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wording presently in use could easily be adapted to provide a new category for
the proposed revision of Official Form B201A to read as follows:
4. Notice to the Individual Consumer Debtor of the right to invoke
privileges, including the privilege against self-incrimination- Any
statement given during the course of proceeding or documents filed in
the proceedings may be used against the person in this or any other
proceeding, including any criminal prosecution. Each individual debtor
may be able to assert a privilege, such as the privilege against selfincrimination. Any petition, schedule, statement, or pleading required to
be filed or contested by the debtor in a responsive pleading shall include
a statement that the respondent admits, denies, does not have and is
unable to obtain sufficient information to admit or deny each allegation,
or that an answer to the allegation is protected by a privilege, including
the privilege against self-incrimination. A statement of lack of
information or a statement that the answer to the allegation is privileged
shall have the effect of a denial.
This simple proposal for an addition to a revised Official Form B201A will go
far in eliminating the dangers that presently lurk for the uninformed debtor.
Whether the individual is an uneducated pro se debtor or a represented debtor
whose attorney has neglected to inform her of her rights, the harm is the same.
No debtor should be denied her Fifth Amendment right to the privilege against
self-incrimination due to personal ignorance or professional neglect.
The Court, under its inherent authority and pursuant to federal law,316
should adopt a revised Official Form B201A to provide notice of the debtor’s
privilege against self-incrimination as numbered paragraph 4 of the current form.
The form should be promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States
pursuant to its authority under FRBP 9009.317 The revised form would help to
insure that the debtor is aware of the privilege prior to filing. In the interim, the
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts should issue the revised
form for use under the Code.318 The Court’s action is necessary to afford the
debtor, who appears before the DOJ trustee in bankruptcy, the same notice that is
currently provided to a civil litigant who is targeted by the DOJ for an
assessment of civil penalties for possession of certain controlled substances.319

answer to the allegation is protected by a privilege, including the privilege against
self-incrimination, and that such a statement shall have the effect of a denial.).
316
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006).
317
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009
318
Id.
319
See supra notes 21 and 24.
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B. The Rulemaking Process
Proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy are handled by a
time proven and statutorily sanctioned process.320 The process is the same for
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Civil, and Criminal
Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.321 There are seven steps in the
process of amending the Code. The first step in the process is the initial
consideration by the Advisory Committee.322 Next is the publication and public
comment period, followed by consideration of the public comments and final
approval by the Advisory Committee. The fourth step is the approval by the
Standing Committee, followed by Judicial Conference Approval. Next, the
United State Supreme Court must give its approval, and finally there must be
Congressional Review and the implementation of the rules.323
As of the date of this publication, there are no completed rules or
pending rules that address the issues surrounding the provision of notice to
individual debtors of their Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.324 All of those involved in the rulemaking process have a
tremendous responsibility. Debtors and lawyers, no less than other citizens, are
beneficiaries of the Court’s efforts to preserve and protect the rights of all parties
in our system of justice. That effort includes the preservation and protection of
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United States Courts, A Summary for the Bench and Bar,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/
SummaryBenchBar.aspx (last visited 2/3/13) The statutory authority is based on the
Rules Enabling Act 28 U.S.C §§ 2071 – 2077.
321
United States Courts, Overview, http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesandpolicies/
rules.aspx (last visited 2/3/13)
322
The composition of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules and
contact information is online at the United States Courts website
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Members_List_Oct_2011.
pdf (last visited 2/3/13). The current chair is the Honorable Eugene R. Wedoff, U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge, Chicago, Illinois.
323
One may argue that any change in Official Form B201A must be preceded by
a statutory amendment to 11 U.S.C. 342(b) because that provision is the statutory
authority for the publication of the notices contained in B201A. The author concedes
that the argument is not without merit, and that statutory amendment is desirable;
however, the disclosure of the privilege included in the DOJ notice was authorized
by administrative rule without the necessity of Congressional action. The
counterargument is that because the privilege originates in the Constitution, no
statutory authority is needed for the Court to make that fact known as a matter of
adjudicatory policy through its rulemaking authority.
324
United
States
Courts,
Pending
Rules
Amendments,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesandpolicies/rules/pending-rules.aspx
(last
visited
2/3/13).
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the rights of debtors and the institutionalization of principles of fundamental
fairness in the bankruptcy courts.
CONCLUSION
The adverse consequences for even one truly innocent debtor, however
seemingly guilty, are disproportionately harsh. The protection of the privilege
for the presumptively innocent is equally important and its loss, equally harsh.
This is particularly true when the protection of every debtor from the inadvertent
loss of the privilege can be so easily accomplished. The current system
perpetuates nondisclosure and allows the unrepresented, uneducated debtor to be
victimized by her own ignorance or the inadvertence of counsel. In both
instances the integrity and respectability of our system of justice are needlessly
impugned.
The cost of adding a disclosure to the debtor regarding her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination means revising a mass produced form to
include a fourth paragraph on the lower half of the second page in an otherwise
blank space. This would be an unburdensome measure that would go far in
preserving one of our most fundamental constitutional rights. The preservation
of that right and its value to an innocent debtor, however seemingly guilty, is
immeasurable. The value to the presumptively innocent is critical as well.
Only when the innocent debtor who is but seemingly guilty receives notice
of her constitutional right to the evidentiary privilege against self-incrimination
will the rules in bankruptcy proceedings “secure the just…determination of
every case and proceeding.” Only then will the privilege take its rightful place
alongside bankruptcy’s mandated notices regarding the availability of credit
counseling services, bankruptcy chapter filing options, bankruptcy crimes, and
the availability of bankruptcy papers to law enforcement officials. Until that
time pro se debtors and debtors with counsel will remain vulnerable to the loss
of the privilege in criminal proceedings because of nondisclosure. The existing
form highlights the opportunity for law enforcement review, investigation and
prosecution of all documents and related matters.325 Without notice, debtors will
face the loss of a privilege scrupulously preserved and guarded throughout our
history in the protection of the constitutional rights of even the worst criminals.
The debtor, who may be among our poorest citizens, should not discover in
the course of her bankruptcy that she has unwittingly forfeited one of her
fundamental constitutional rights.326 To avoid this result, Official Form B201A

325

Official Form B201A, FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009, 11 U.S.C. §342(b).
Total consumer (nonbusiness) filings for the 12-month period ending
September 30, 2011, were 1,417,326 comprising 97% of all bankruptcy filings. See
Table F-2 U.S. Bankruptcy Courts-Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by
Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, during the 12-Month Period Ending September 30,
2011.
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should be revised in a simple, straightforward way by providing notice of the
privilege to all individual debtors prior to the time of filing.
A revision of Official Form B201A to include notice of the privilege will
benefit the attorneys who represent debtors as well. History reveals how fluid
the privilege and the law surrounding it can be.327 The privilege, like the law
itself, is a moving stream with waters that rise and recede and sometimes
overflow the banks to course where they will. Skilled counsel, like experienced
boatmen, do well to observe the weather before braving the currents with those
entrusted to their care.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/
2011/0911_f2.pdf (last visited 2/3/13). 2007 through 2010 inclusive filings are
available
at
the
United
States
Courts
website,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last visited 2/3/13).
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See supra Part I.E.
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APPENDIX A
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:
Trustee:
Sophie:

Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth?
I do.
Please state your name for the record.
My name is Sophie Debtor and I’m from Hard Luck Town.
Did you read your voluntary petition and schedules?
Yes.
Does it include all your property?
Yes.
Have you listed all of your debts?
No. I recently discovered a credit card bill.
What’s the bill for?
Cash advances and jewelry.
When were these transactions?
Within the past 60 days.
How much were they?
The advance was $1000 and the jewelry was also $1000.
Do you have the cash or the jewelry?
No.
What did you do with these items?
My husband gave them to someone without my permission.
Where are they?
Corrie Delecti’s apartment in Hard Luck Town.
Is that the woman who was recently murdered?
Yes.
How do you know the cash advances and jewelry are there?
My estranged husband told me.
Have you amended your schedule to reflect these transactions?
No.
Will you do so?
Yes.

